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ABSTRACT
This thesis studies the technological change in the US commercial banking market
and its influence on banks’ lending practices. The second chapter provides some
empirical facts.
The third chapter studies the welfare consequences of the destructive creation
(bank branches replaced by internet banking) of the US commercial banking market
following the Great Recession of 2009. Using a structural model, this paper finds
that the cleansing effect (closure of unproductive bank branches) of the recession
increases the units of internet banking by about 56% in 2016, compared to the case
where the cleansing effect is absent. The share of internet banking in the retail
service market is increased from 48% to 60% and the price of internet banking service
is decreased by a factor of 16 by the cleansing effect of the Great Recession. The
two changes lowers the price of retail banking services in 2016 by 37%: 53% of the
price reduction is attributable to the replacement of branches by internet banking
and 47% is attributable to the reduction of the price of internet banking. However,
this cleansing effect also results in a 2.5% decrease in small business services in small
cities. These findings suggest that the cleansing effect of the recession benefits retail
consumers. However, small business lending may suffer.
The fourth chapter evaluates how information technology (IT) improvements con-
tribute to the decline of small business lending in the US commercial banking market
from 2002 to 2017. This paper estimates a general equilibrium dynamic model with
banks that differ in size and choose the level of transaction (hard information inten-
sive) and relationship (soft information intensive) lending. The model shows that
banks costs of evaluating borrowers hard information declined over this period by
46%, and small business loans fell by 7% (12% in the data). This paper finds that
banks higher reliance on IT to issue transaction loans is responsible for 37% of the
i
decline in the data, and the consolidation caused by IT improvements caused 22% of
the decline. Contrary to previous findings, this chapter finds that when general equi-
librium is considered, policy protecting small banks cannot increase small business
lending.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Great technological changes happened in the US commercial banking market in the
last several decades. Think about thirty year ago: we need to go to a branch to de-
posit a check; now, we just need to use our smartphones to scan the check and upload
it to our checking account through our mobile banking app. The process of lending
is also much simpler. Mortgages are standardized such that no in-person meeting is
needed to issue a mortgage. Car loans, consumption loans and even lending to large
corporations are now mostly based on computers and software.
In this project, I study how these technological changes have reshaped the banking
market. I focus on two aspects: the welfare implications for retail consumers, large
corporations and small businesses, and the welfare implications for large and small
banks. I find that technological changes favor retail consumers and large corpora-
tions, but hurt small businesses. The improvement of information technology also
allows large banks to gain market share and crowd out small banks.
In Chapter 2, I first provide some empirical evidence about the technological
change, the change in bank lending practice and the change in banking market struc-
tures. Chapter 3 examines whether and to what degree, the cleansing effect of the
Great Recession has accelerated banks’ adoption of internet banking (including online
banking through computers and mobile banking through smartphones) and closing
of branches. Then I use a structural model to evaluate the welfare implications for
retail consumers and firms. In Chapter 4, I study to what degree and through what
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mechanisms, the improvement of information technology has decreased lending to
small businesses.
Chapter 3 finds that the cleansing effect (closure of unproductive bank branches)
encourages banks to adopt 56% more units of internet banking in 2016. Compared to
the case where this cleansing effect is absent, in 2016, the share of internet banking
in retail service market increases to 60% from 48% and the price of internet banking
service decreases by a factor of 16. The two changes lower the price of retail banking
services in 2016 by 37%: 53% of the price reduction is attributable to the replacement
of branches by internet banking and 47% is attributable to the reduction of the price
of internet banking. However, this cleansing effect also results in a 2.5% decrease in
small business services in small cities. Our findings suggest that the cleansing effect
of the recession benefits retail consumers. However, small business lending may suffer.
Chapter 4 evaluates how information technology (IT) improvements contribute to
the decline of small business lending in the US commercial banking market from 2002
to 2017. I estimate a general equilibrium dynamic model with banks that differ in
sizes and choose the level of transaction (hard information intensive) and relationship
(soft information intensive) lending. The model shows that banks costs of evaluating
borrowers hard information declined over this period by 46%, and small business
loans fell by 7% (12% in the data). I find that banks higher reliance on IT to
issue transaction loans is responsible for 37% of the decline in the data, and the
consolidation caused by IT improvements caused 22% of the decline. Contrary to
previous work, I find that when general equilibrium is considered, policy protecting
small banks cannot increase small business lending.
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Chapter 2
MOTIVATION FACTS
In this chapter, I provide facts about banks’ increasing adoption of information
technology, the increasing market concentration in the US commercial banking mar-
ket and the decreasing lending to small businesses. I also provide evidence about why
small businesses are important in the economy.
2.1 Facts about Banks Technology Adoption: Branches vs Internet Banking
A dynamic trend continues in the US commercial banking market in recent ten
years. Banks started to close their physical branches after the Great Recession and
continue to do so. The total number of branches of all US commercial banks declined
by 9% (from about 99,000 to about 89,000) from 2009 to 2017 (Fig.2.1). Meanwhile,
more and more bank customers are using online banking and mobile banking–together
as internet banking. In 2001 there are about 50 million internet banking users, and in
2017 there were about 300 million users (The data about online banking and mobile
banking is from the following sources: Survey of Consumers’ Use of Mobile Finan-
cial Services (2012-2016) conducted by the Federal Reserve Board; Digital Banking
Consumer Survey done by PwC, Emarketer, and Bank of America). Most strikingly,
after the recession, internet banking users increased faster than before: from 1998 to
2009, the number of internet banking users increased by 14 million annually; how-
ever, from 2010 to 2017, the number of internet banking users increased by 28 million
annually (Fig.2.3). Since banks adopted mobile banking in 2008, the number of users
has increased by more than 200% (Fig.2.2). The Survey of Consumers’ Use of Mobile
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Financial Services (2012-2016) shows that from 2012 to 2015 the market share of
internet banking (online banking and mobile banking) increased from 52% to 57%.
The recession was a turning point for banks. Before the recession, banks built up
branches, but after the recession, banks began to close their branches in both large
and small cities. Most interestingly, large banks built up more branches in large cities
(compared to in small cities) before the recession and closed more branches in small
cities (compared to in large cities) after the recession; however, small banks built up
more branches in small cities (compared to in large cities) before the recession and
closed more branches in large cities (compared to in large cities) after the recession.
Table 2.1 shows this fact. (I define large banks as the banking holding company with
total deposits in the upper 20% and small banks as other banks. I define large cities as
metro areas containing a core urban area containing population of 50,000 or more and
small cities as other cities). From 1998 to 2009, the number of large banks’ branches
in large cities increased by 25%, from 54,016 to 67,527; the number of large banks’
branches in small cities increased by 9%, from 10,909 to 11,846; the number of small
banks’ branches in large cities increased by 16%, from 9,373 to 10,900; the number
of large banks’ branches in small cities increased by 6%, from 8,424 to 8,922. From
2010 to 2017, the number of large banks’ branches in large cities decreased by 7%,
from 66,730 to 62,268; the number of large banks’ branches in small cities decreased
by 10%, from 11,829 to 10,627; the number of small banks’ branches in large cities
decreased by 17%, from 10,588 to 8,772; the number of large banks’ branches in small
cities decreased by 7%, from 8,807 to 8,190.
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Figure 2.1: Internet Banking and Branches
This picture compares the percent change in branches, online banking users and mobile banking
users. Data source: Deposit Market Share Reports - Summary of Deposits Data from Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation and Pew Research Center.
Figure 2.2: Increasing Internet Banking Users
This picture shows that the number of internet banking users has increased. Internet banking
includes online banking and mobile banking. Data source: Pew Research Center.
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Figure 2.3: Change in Internet Banking and Branches
This figure compares the change in branches (in hundreds), online banking users and mobile bank-
ing users (in millions). Internet banking includes mobile banking and online banking. Data source:
Deposit Market Share Reports - Summary of Deposits Data from Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration and Pew Research Center.
2.2 Motivation Facts about Lending to Small Businesses and the Importance of
Small Businesses
The following figures and table show some key dynamic features of the U.S. com-
mercial banking industry and the characteristics of US firms. First, US banks have
increased their use of software. Second, US banks have reduced lending to small busi-
nesses. Third, the US banking market is increasingly concentrated. Fourth, younger
firms are smaller and have higher rates of exit, but have the largest employment
growth with 1 million dollars of bank loans.
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Table 2.1: Branches in Large and Small Cities
This table shows the difference growth rates of bank branches in large and small cities for large and
small banks. I define large banks as the banking holding company with total deposits in the upper
20% and small banks as other banks. I define large cities as metro areas contains a core urban area
containing population of 50,000 or more and small cities as other cities
From 1998 to 2009
large cities small cities
large bank +25% +9%
small bank +16% +6%
From 2010 to 2017
large cities small cities
large bank -7% -10%
small bank -17% -7%
2.2.1 An Upward Trend in Technology Usage
Fig.2.4 shows the increasing use of software in the U.S. commercial banking sector.
Banks’ software stock, including prepared software (ENS1), custom software (ENS2),
and own-account software (ENS3) increased from about $18 billion in 2002 to about
$36 billion in 2016, by 100% (in constant 2017 U.S. dollars). The data are from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), Current-Cost Net Capital Stock of Private
Nonresidential Fixed Assets. Fig.2.5 shows that the cost of processing information
per dollar of loans decreased over time, from .078% to .067% from 2012 to 2017.
2.2.2 Trends in Lending Practice
I use data from the FDIC reports on US depository institutions for 2002 to 2017.
All the dollar amounts are in constant 2017 US dollars. Fig.2.6 shows the decline in
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Figure 2.4: Increasing Usage of Information Technology
The figure shows banks’ software stock increased from $18 billion to $36 billion during 2002 to 2016
in constant 2017 dollars. Banks’ software stock includes prepared software (ENS1), custom software
(ENS2), and own-account software (ENS3). The data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA), Current-Cost Net Capital Stock of Private Nonresidential Fixed Assets Table.
small business lending relative to total bank loans. Small business loans as a share
of total bank loans decreased monotonically from about 6.7% to about 3.5%. Fig.2.7
and Fig.2.8 show the increasing concentration in the US commercial banking market:
the market share of large banks with loans of more than $1 billion increased from
82% to 90%; the number of small banks with loans of less than $100 million dollars
decreased from 4,707 to 2,072.
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Figure 2.5: Decreasing Costs of Using Information Technology
The figure shows that the cost of processing information per dollar of loan decreased over time,
from .078% to .067% from 2012 to 2017. This item represents total costs and fees incurred in
processing banks’ data, including computer services, technology expense and software expenses.
The information costs of per dollar loans equal banks’ information expenses divided by total loans.
Data are from Compustat Bank Fundamentals Annual.
2.2.3 Firm Sizes, Ages, Exit Rates, Loan Denial Rates and Job Creation Rates
I use data from the Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS) from 1977 to 2015, the
2014 Annual Survey of Entrepreneurs, US Census Bureau and Brown et al. (2015).
Table 2.2 shows that younger firms have lower loan approval rates conditional on
application, but can create more jobs with $1 million dollars of financing. Fig.2.9
shows that younger firms are smaller and have higher exit rates.
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Figure 2.6: Share of Small Business Loans
The figure shows that small business loans as a share of total bank loans decreased monotonically
from about 6.7% to about 3.5% from 2002 to 2017. The data is from the FDIC reports on US
depository institutions.
Table 2.2: Firm Age, Loan Approval Rates and Net Jobs Created
This table shows the relationship between firm ages, firms’ loan approval rates and the net jobs
created with one million dollars of bank loans. In the table, firms younger than 2 years in age
created the most net new jobs with $1 million of bank loans; however, they had the least loan
approval rates. Data Source: 2014 Annual Survey of Entrepreneurs, U.S. Census Bureau and Brown
et al. (2015).
Age Approval Rates (%) Net Jobs Created with $1 Million of Loans
<2 61.5 3.13–5.34
2-3 65.7 3.13
4-5 69.3 2.96
6-10 72 2.96
11-15 79.3 3.02
>16 84.9 3.02
10
Figure 2.7: Increasing Market Share of Large Banks
The figure shows that the market share of large banks with loans of more than $1 billion increased
from 82% to 90%. The data is from the FDIC reports on U.S. depository institutions. Dollars are
in 2017 constant US dollars.
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Figure 2.8: Exit of Small Banks
The figure shows that the number of small banks with loans of less than $100 million decreased from
4,707 to 2,072. The data is from the FDIC reports on US depository institutions. Dollars are in
2017 constant US dollars.
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Figure 2.9: The Exit Rates of Small Firms
This figure shows that small and young firms have higher exit rates than large and old firms. Firms
in the first age group are younger than two years old. Firms in the second age group are two years
old. Firms in the third age group are three years old. Firms in the fourth age group are four years
old. Firms in the fifth age group are five years old. Firms in the sixth age group are six to ten years
old. Firms in the seventh age group are eleven to fifteen years old. Firms in the eighth age group
are sixteen to twenty years old. Firms in the ninth age group are twenty-one to twenty-five years
old. Firms in the tenth age group are over twenty-five years old. The data are from the Business
Dynamics Statistics (BDS) for 1977 to 2015.
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Chapter 3
DESTRUCTIVE CREATION IN THE US COMMERCIAL BANKING MARKET
We study the cleansing effect of the Great Recession on the US commercial bank-
ing market. The cleansing effect of recessions is “the essential fact about capitalism”
and involves a large reallocation of labor and capital from inefficient to efficient pro-
duction units of the economy (Schumpeter, 2010). Although the existence and the
welfare implications of the cleansing effect are well established in theoretical frame-
work (Aghion et al., 2015; Caballero and Hammour, 1996), it is not clear empirically
(Argente et al., 2018; Barlevy, 2003; Aghion et al., 2015; Foster et al., 2016). With-
out a better understanding of the cleansing effect, we cannot better understand firms’
technology adoption along business cycles and the barriers that prevent firms from
adopting more advanced technology. If, during recessions, firms are encouraged to
adopt new technology and abandon old, unproductive ones, then policy during re-
cessions may be redesigned based on the mechanisms of the cleansing effect. This
paper first uses a difference in differences empirical design to establish the causal
relationship between the Great Recession and the accelerated adoption of internet
banking (online banking and mobile banking) by commercial banks. Then we build
a quantitative model to evaluate to what extent the cleansing effect during the Great
Recession contributes to banks’ adoption of internet banking and the welfare impli-
cations of the cleansing effect for retail consumers and firms in large and small cities.
In order to establish a causal relationship between the recession and banks’ adop-
tion of internet banking, we use a difference in differences empirical method. We
use data from the Consumer Payment Survey to identify whether a consumer uses
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internet banking. We use the data from US Bureau of Labor Statistics to identify the
states that were hit harder than average by the Great Recession. In the regression,
states hit harder than average are the states with an increase in unemployment rates
that is greater than the median level from January 2008 to January 2010. We com-
pare the increase in consumer adoption of internet banking before and after the Great
Recession in states that were hit harder and in the states hit less by the recession.
We find that consumers in the first group of states are more likely to increase their
adoption of internet banking after the recession. In the regression, we also find that
consumers with higher income and consumers who are employed are more likely to
adopt internet banking. Therefore, we exclude the concern that the recession lowers
consumers’ income and they then choose a cheaper method of banking.
To quantify to what extent the recession has increased banks’ adoption of internet
banking and to evaluate welfare implications of this change on retail consumers and
firms, we build a quantitative framework with a model of general equilibrium. In the
model, banks trade off branches and internet banking along business cycles in large
and small cities and retail consumers decide whether to use internet banking and
branch banking given the price ratio between internet banking and branch banking
and their access to internet and smartphones. In the model, a large bank and a small,
comparatively less productive bank, compete in three markets: that of retail service
and the markets of business service in both large and small cities. Banks have two
technologies: bank branches and internet banking. Branches can be used to provide
business service and retail service. Internet banking can be used to provide retail
service, but at a much lower cost. Therefore it is more productive to provide retail
service by internet banking. However, banks have to pay costs to adjust their units
of branches and internet banking. In the model, a bank has an option to restructure
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its production line of internet banking at a cost proportionate to its current profits.
By doing so, the bank will have no cost to increase their units of internet banking,
In normal times, when banks’ profits are high, it is very costly to restructure; how-
ever, during a recession time period, banks have lower profits and thus lower costs
to restructure. This is the benefit of waiting for a recession to restructure. How-
ever, as consumers have more and more access to the internet through computers and
smartphones, they demand more and more internet banking. If a bank restructures
earlier, it can better satisfy the increasing demand from consumers and can thereby
gain profits. This is the cost of waiting for the recession to restructure. In the model,
banks trade off the benefits and costs and decide when to restructure.
The popularity of smartphones coincides with the Great Recession. Therefore,
there is a concern that banks may have restructured their production line of internet
banking around the year 2009, not because of the cheaper costs to do so but because
there was a jump in consumer demand for internet banking. To alleviate this concern,
we model consumers’ choices over internet banking and branches considering their ac-
cess to internet and smartphones. By doing so, we can evaluate to what extent the
cleansing effect of banks restructuring their line of production and reallocating their
resources from less productive units (branches) to more productive units (internet
banking) has increased banks’ adoption of internet banking after the recession.
We use the simulated method of moments to identify the values of parameters
in the model. The parameter in the adjustment costs of bank branches is identified
from how fast banks closed branches from 2010 through 2016. The parameter in the
adjustment costs of internet banking is identified from the percentage change in in-
ternet banking users from 1998 to 2009. The parameter that captures competition of
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large and small banks is identified from the difference in changes of bank branches in
metropolitan areas and nonmetropolitan areas from 1998 through 2009. The param-
eter that measures banks’ marginal costs of maintaining branches is identified from
the difference in the number of branches opened by large banks between large and
small cities from 1998 through 2009.The cost of internet banking is identified from
the increase of internet banking after 2010. The parameters of consumers’ prefer-
ences are identified from the share of internet banking from 2012 through 2015. In
the data, we see that the number of internet banking users increased faster after the
recession; therefore, banks chose to restructure during the recession. The parameter
that measures the costs of restructuring is identified from this fact.
The model does a reasonable job in explaining the data. We set the first period
of the model to the year 1998 in the data. That is, we take the average number
of branches of a large bank, of a small bank in a large city, and of a small bank in
a small city in 1998 as the starting values of the model. The number of branches
increases/decreases gradually at a linear trend; therefore, we do not need to match
all the points in each year period. We just need to match the critical points that
include the number of branches in 2009 (when the number of branches peaked), the
number of branches in 2010 (when the recession decreased banks’ productivity), the
number of branches in 2016 (the last period in the data), the increased percentage
of internet banking from 1998 through 2009 (the time periods before the restructure)
and the increased percentage of internet banking from 2010 through 2016 (the time
periods after the restructure). The first group of moments is the number of branches
for a large bank in a large city, a large bank in a small city, and a small bank in a
small city in 2009. In the model, in 2009, the number of branches for a large bank in
a large city is 8.4 (vs 8.24 in the data); the number of branches for a large bank in a
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small city is 2.41 (vs 2.56 in the data); the number of branches for a small bank in a
large city is 2.17 (vs 2.27 in the data); the number of branches for a small bank in a
small city is 1.83 (vs 1.71 in the data). The second group of moments is the number
of branches for a large bank in a large city, a large bank in a small city, and a small
bank in a small city in 2010. In the model, in 2010, the number of branches for a large
bank in a large city is 7.87 (vs 8.91 in the data); the number of branches for a large
bank in a small city is 1.9 (vs 2.25 in the data); the number of branches for a small
bank in a large city is 2.22 (vs 2.59 in the data); the number of branches for a small
bank in a small city is 1.73 (vs 1.7 in the data).The third group of moments is the
number of branches for a large bank in a large city, a large bank in a small city, and
a small bank in a small city in 2016. In the model, in 2016, the number of branches
for a large bank in a large city is 8.31 (vs 8.57 in the data); the number of branches
for a large bank in a small city is 2.22 (vs 2.49 in the data); the number of branches
for a small bank in a large city is 2.1 (vs 1.98 in the data); the number of branches
for a small bank in a small city is 1.78 (vs 1.62 in the data).The fourth group of
moments includes the percentage of increase of internet banking from 1998 through
2009 and from 2010 through 2016. From 1998 through 2009, the unit of internet
banking increased by 13 times (vs 14 times in the data) and from 2010 through 2016,
the unit of internet banking increased by 0.97 times (vs 0.9 times in the data).
The estimation of the model shows that the cost of building up branches is one-
eighth the cost of building up internet banking before the Great Recession. That is
why, before the Great Recession, banks chose to build up branches to increase their
supply of retail service. However, However, as the cost of providing a unit of retail
service using internet banking is less than 2.5% as great as the cost of using branches,
after the recession banks started to close branches and increased their rate of building
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up internet banking.
Branches will not disappear, though. Branches are used by banks to serve firms.
The model shows that it is very profitable to keep branches and that the profits of
having a branch in a large city are twice those of a bank in a small city. Therefore, af-
ter the recession, large banks close more branches in small cities compared to in large
cities. However, the situation is very different for small banks. Although revenues
are high from branches in large cities, the competition costs in large cities are also
high. On average, both large and small banks have 10 branches in a large city but
they have only 4 branches in a small city. Therefore, the competition costs in large
cities are 2.5 times as high as in small cities. Most importantly, these competition
costs account for 50% of banks’ total costs of maintaining branches. Therefore, as
small banks are not productive enough as to compete with large banks in large cities,
they close a larger percentage of branches in large cities after the recession compared
to large banks (the productivity of a small bank is as half as that of a large bank)
compared to those closed by large banks because the productivity of a small bank is
half that of a large bank. As small banks closed many branches, their marginal costs
of having additional branch in small cities decrease, so they do not close as many
branches in small cities as in large cities.
The model shows that restructuring will cost a bank 45% of its current profits.
However, the recession lowers the cost of restructuring by at least 50%. Therefore,
the restructure in 2010 accelerated large banks’ adoption of internet banking since
then. The model shows that, in 2016, the unit of internet banking is 47.3. How-
ever, suppose there is no restructure in 2010; the unit would be 30.3. This means
that the restructuring increases the unit of internet banking in 2016 by 56%. The
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share of internet banking in 2016 would be 48% if there were no restructuring; it
was 60% when restructuring happened in 2016. The average price of retail service in
2016 thus decreases by 37%, from 0.41 (without restructure in 2016) to 0.26 (with
restructure in 2016) (The average price of retail service equals sum of the share of
branch banking times the price of branch banking and the share of internet banking
times the price of internet banking.) The decrease in the price of retail service comes
from two parts: first, expensive branch banking is replaced by internet banking; sec-
ond, internet banking itself becomes cheaper after the restructure. In 2016, the price
of using a unit of branch banking is 0.62 and the price of using a unit of internet
banking is 0.0074, which is less than 2% of that of branch banking. Because of the
restructure, the share of internet banking in 2016 increases from 48% to 60%. If the
share of internet banking had stayed at 48% instead of 60%, the average price of retail
service would be 0.33. Therefore, the replacement of branches by internet banking
itself contributes to 53% of the price drop. The drop of the price of internet banking
thus accounts for 47% of the price reduction.
However, there are costs from the cleansing effect for firms in small cities. As
banks replace branches with internet banking, some firms receive fewer loans. With-
out the cleansing effect and restructuring, in 2016, on average both large banks and
small banks in small cities would have 4.1 branches in total. With the cleansing effect
and restructuring, in 2016, on average both large banks and small banks in small
cities would have 4 branches in total. Therefore, the cleansing effect reduces loans to
firms in small cities by 2.5% in 2016.
We have three contributions to the literature. First, we use a difference in differ-
ences method to show that the cleansing effect–that is, branches replaced by internet
banking–exists in the US commercial banking market, which is not empirically sup-
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ported by previous literature (Dal Pont Legrand and Hagemann, 2017; Aghion et al.,
2015; Argente et al., 2018; Barlevy, 2003; Eslava et al., 2010; Foster et al., 2016;
Garcia-Macia et al., 2016). We, therefore, support the conclusion from Hershbein
and Kahn (2016), who find that more computer skills are demanded by employers
after the Great Recession. In addition, we quantitatively evaluate the contribution
from the cleansing effect to banks’ adoption of internet banking. Second, we are the
first to analyze the welfare effects from internet banking adoption and to contribute
to the literature on e-commerce. Eslava et al. (2010) shows that the gain from e-
commerce is equivalent to a 1.3% permanent increase in consumption by 2014. From
our results, the effects can be large. The estimation results show that consumers’
demand for retail service in 2016 is increased by more than 30% because banks adopt
internet banking at a faster speed after the recession. Third, we explore some poten-
tial downsides of this creative destruction. Branches are valuable to business service,
especially to small businesses (Nguyen, 2014). Many small businesses are located in
small cities and, when banks close many branches in small cities, these small busi-
nesses can be more financially constrained than before.
3.1 Recession and Internet Banking Usage: Reduced-Form Evidence
In this section, We use a difference in differences regression design to show empir-
ically that the Great Recession accelerated banks’ adoption of internet banking. We
use data from the Survey of Consumer Payment Choice, 2008-2013 and data from the
US Bureau of Labor Statistics to test whether the recession from 2008 through 2010
accelerated bank’s adoption of of internet banking. The data on internet banking
usage is from the Survey of Consumer Payment Choice, 2008-2013. This data set
contains repeated cross-section individual consumer data. This data set has informa-
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tion about a consumer’s adoption of internet banking and his/her other demographic
characteristics, including state of residence, income, age, marital status, education,
gender, race and employment status. The recession data is from the US Bureau of
Labor Statistics. This data set has information on the monthly unemployment rate
of each US state. We define a state as heavily hit by the recession if it had an increase
in unemployment above the median level of 5.3% from from January 2008 through
January 2010. In the data, we can only see if the income level belongs to a certain
range, not the absolute dollar amounts. I define high-income consumers as consumers
with annual income more than 100,000 dollars. In the data set, about 10% of con-
sumers have high income. The variable education is defined as 1 if the consumer
has less than a 1st grade education; as 2 if the consumer completed 1st, 2nd, 3rd,
or 4th grade; as 3 if the consumer completed 5th or 6th grade; as 4 if the consumer
completed 7th or 8th grade; as 5 if the consumer completed 9th grade; as 6 if the
consumer completed 10th grade; as 7 if the consumer completed 11th grade; as 8 if
the consumer attended 12th grade but received no diploma; as 9 if the consumer has
a high school diploma or the equivalent (for example, a GED); as 10 if the consumer
has some college but no degree; as 11 if the consumer has an associate degree in a
college occupational/vocational program; as 12 if the consumer has an associate de-
gree in a college academic program; as 13 if the consumer has a bachelors degree (for
example, BA, AB, or BS); as 14 if the consumer has a masters degree; as 15 if the
consumer has a professional school degree (for example, MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD);
and as 16 if the consumer has a doctoral degree (for example, PhD, EdD). A white
consumer is indicated as 1. Employment status is defined as 1 if the consumer is
employed and otherwise as 0. Marital status is defined as 1 if married and otherwise
as 0. Gender is defined as 1 if male and otherwise as 0. In Table 3.4, I compare the
income, age, marital status, education, gender, race, and employment status of the
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people surveyed from the hit states and the not-hit states. In Table 3.4, I compare
the income, age, martial status, education, gender, race, employment status of the
surveyed people from the hit states and the not hit states. I do not find significant
difference between these two groups with respect to demographic characteristics and
their adoption of internet banking before the crisis. Before the recession, all the states
had about 70% of consumers using internet banking to make payments; after the re-
cession, 78% of consumers used internet banking to make payments in the states hit
hard by the recession and 74% of consumers used internet banking to make payments
in the states not hit hard by the recession.
The empirical design uses a difference in differences approach. The treatment
group is those states with an increase in the unemployment rate above the median
level during the Great Recession. The control group includes other states. The period
before treatment is from 2008 through 2010 and the period after treatment is from
2010 to 2013. We compare the results from the Probit model and the Logit model.
The dependent variable in the regression is a dummy that indicates whether the
consumer has adopted internet banking. The key independent variable is a cross of
two dummies: the first one indicates whether the state where the consumer resides was
hit heavily by the recession and the second one indicates the years after 2010. I include
a consumer’s income, age, marital status, education, gender, race and employment
status and year-fixed effect in the regression. The regressions show that in the states
that are heavily hit by the recession, there is a larger increase in the adoption of
internet banking. However, the limitation in the data set is that we cannot separate
the supply from the banks and the demand from the consumers. One possibility
is that the recession lowers consumer’s income and therefore, consumers use more
internet banking, which is cheaper than branches. This concern is excluded by the
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result that consumers with income higher than 100 thousand dollars per year are
more likely to adopt internet banking. Another concern is that the recession is not
exogenous. Banks in the states hit hard by the recession have worse performance and
tighter liquidity. This worse banking condition makes it more difficult for firms hit
harder to survive. Therefore, we see more layoffs in these states. This concern will
not affect our empirical results. In the paper, we are trying to show that it is cheaper
to restructure the production line within banks when banks have lower profits, The
regression is specified as
Internet−banking−adoptionjit = β0 + β1recessionit × year−after−2010t
+controlsjit + jit
where Internet−banking−adoptionjit is whether consumer j at state i has adopted
internet banking at time t, recessionit is a dummy variable whether state i is hit hard
by the recession at time t, year−after−2010t is a dummy variable whether time t is
after year 2010, and controlsjit include the consumer’s demographic characters. The
results of the regressions are in Table 3.5
3.2 Model
The model is built on Koenders et al. (2005); Berger et al. (2012); Hendricks
(2011). Two forces prevent banks from increasing the adoption of internet banking
and the closing branches. Banks have adjustment costs in adopting internet bank-
ing and closing branches. These costs are identified in the literature as contracting,
training, recruitment, and firing (Caballero and Hammour, 1996; Aghion et al., 2015;
Dal Pont Legrand and Hagemann, 2017; Hershbein and Kahn, 2016). When banks
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have increasing marginal costs of adjustment, they must adjust the units of branches
or internet banking more slowly. This convexity in banks’ cost function abstracts
the role financial constraint plays in a bank. During recessions, banks have lower
returns from branches and internet banking. As the marginal costs of adjustments
do not decrease, banks will adjust less in order to reduce their costs. (Using Colom-
bian establishment-level data, Eslava et al. (2010) present empirical evidence that
the exit margin is distorted in times of financial constraints in a manner consistent
with the model of Barlevy (2003).). A bank can restructure the production units so
as to reduce the adjustment costs of internet banking to zero, but it needs to give
up a proportion of profits of current period. In reality, the restructure can be set-
ting up new positions, changing the production lines and re-matching positions with
workers. These changes will distract managers’ and workers’ focus from producing
and, therefore, are very costly. However, after these changes, a bank can have lower
costs of recruiting and contracting with workers who can perform better at internet
banking-related positions. As these costs are procyclic, banks prefer to restructure
during recessions. However, over time, with the popularity of internet and smart-
phones, internet banking becomes more convenient for consumers. Therefore, banks
may like to restructure as early as possible and may not wait until a recession.
The model also explains why large and small banks behave differently in large and
small cities. Banks can sell their service at higher prices in larger cities than in small
cities. Hence, banks are willing to open more branches in large cities. Therefore, it is
more competitive and more expensive for banks to expand in large cities than in small
cities. As large banks can produce more at the same cost, they gain more by opening
branches in large cities than do small banks. Small banks, with low productivity,
will find that the high costs of expansion are difficult to bear; therefore, small banks,
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small banks will open fewer new branches in large cities compared to large banks.
When the technology changes reduce the price of retailing service and the costs of
building up internet banking, the marginal benefits of bank branches decrease. As the
marginal costs of maintaining branches increase, banks will close branches to decrease
those costs. Large banks will keep their branches in large cities and close branches in
small cities because large banks have higher marginal benefit from branches in large
cities than in small cities. On the contrary, small banks will find the high costs of
maintaining branches in large cities are harder to bear than before because of the
decrease in marginal benefits. In addition, the competition in small cities is much
reduced because of the exit of large banks. Therefore, small banks will close a higher
percentage of branches in large cities than in small cities, compared to large banks.
Model Details
Periods t = 1, 2, .... Two cities, a large city (LC) and a small city (SC), each with
productivity Ax, x = L, S. Two banks, a large bank (LB) and a small bank (SB),
each with productivity mj, j = LB, SB. We assume that the productivity of the
large bank is greater than that of the small bank, i.e. mLB > mSB. A firm at city
x produces profits by its technology equal to
Axbx − rxbx
where bx is the amount of bank service (bank product) used and rx is the price of
bank loan. The assumption is that both large banks and small banks provide identical
loans at the same prices in each city.
A bank maximizes expected profits. A bank has two methods of delivering prod-
ucts/service (used interchangeably) to its customers. It can either use a branch or
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use internet banking to deliver its products/services. A bank also has two types of
customers: retail customers and business customers (firms). Retail customers need
retail service while firms need business service from banks. A bank produces 1 unit
of retail service with a unit of branch or with a unit of internet banking. Thus,
retail customers can either be served by a branch or by internet banking. A bank
also produces 1 unit of business service with a unit of branch. Thus, firms (business
customers) can only be served by a branch.
Let Bjx,t denote the number of branches of bank j in city x at time t. The cost of
branches for bank j is:
cjB,t = c0(
∑
xB
j
x,t)
2 + c1
∑
x(
∑
j B
j
x,t)B
j
x,t
The first term of the cost captures the decreasing returns to scale in banks’ production
technology and the second part captures the increasing cost of branch expansion due
to competition in a city between two banks. The cost of internet banking is:
cjI,t = cII
j
t
for bank j with Ijt units of internet banking in period t. We use the subscript B
to denote branches and I to denote internet banking, respectively.
A bank faces increasing marginal costs to adjust its production units. That is,
φB
2
∑
x
(
∆Bjx,t
)2
represents the additional investments in increasing the number of
branches for a bank j at time t across all cities x and φI
2
(
∆Ijt
)2
for the increase in
internet banking for bank j at time t. The bank has the option of restructuring its
internet banking system by forgoing a portion of its profits this period. By doing so,
it eliminates all the adjustment costs for increasing its internet banking capacity in
the future. That is, by restructuring its internet banking system, φI is reduced to 0
for all future periods. However, it will lose λ proportion of its profits of this period.
This generates a trade-off between restructuring during normal times when profits
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are high versus restructuring during recessions when profits are low. By incurring a
higher cost of restructuring during normal times, the bank might be able to deliver
retail service through internet banking at a lower cost to its customers (compared
to branch banking). We discuss additional details of the retail service demand while
defining the retail consumer’s problem.
Bank j’s Problem
The bank maximizes its profits by choosing whether to restructure its internet
banking system, Rjt . R
j
t = 1 means restructuring in period t and otherwise, 0; its
units of branches and internet banking, {BjLC,t, BjSC,t, Ijt },
max
{BjLC,t,BjSC,t,Ijt ,Rjt}
(1− λRjt )
{
mj(pB,t(B
j
LC,t +B
j
SC,t) + pI,t I
j
t ) +m
j
∑
x
rxB
j
x,t
−c0
2
(
∑
x
Bjx,t)
2 −
∑
x
c1(
∑
j
Bjx,t)B
j
x,t
−cIIJt −
φB
2
∑
x
(
∆Bjx,t
)2 − φI
2
(
∆Ijt
)2}
+
β
{
RjtV
R(BjLC,t, B
j
SC,t, I
j
t , B
−j
LC,t, B
−j
SC,t, I
−j
t )
+(1−Rjt )V NR(BjLC,t, BjSC,t, Ijt , B−jLC,t, B−jSC,t, I−jt )
}
where V R is the continuation value after restructuring and V NR is the continua-
tion value if there is no restructuring. The subscript -j denotes all competitor banks
of bank j. In the model, a bank can only restructure once. That is, Rt = 0, if there
is j > 0 such that Rt−j = 1. In addition, the small bank will never restructure given
the assumptions. Suppose the small bank restructures before the large bank. When
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the small bank finds it profitable to restructure, the large bank will it profitable to re-
structure too, given its assumed productivity advantage over the small bank. When
(after) the large bank restructures, the small bank will find find it unprofitable to
further build up internet banking because of the ability of the large bank to set the
internet banking price as low as possible to eliminate profits for the small bank, while
it continues to be profitable due to its higher productivity. Therefore, the small bank
will not restructure.
Consumer’s Problem
In the model, there is a representative retail consumer. The retail service demand
is:
Dt = D/(p
ρ
B,t + p
ρ
I,t)
1
ρ
where pB,t is the price for retail service provided by a branch (assumed to be the
same in both the large city and the small city) and pI,t is the price for retail service
provided by internet banking (again, common to both cities), both prices at time t
and D is a parameter and 1
1−ρ is the constant elasticity of substitution between the
two retail services. Banks are price takers in a competitive market. Thus, the retail
service product is homogeneous across both cities and the type of banks and can
be supplied by either the small bank or the large bank either through a branch or
through internet banking. Recall, in contrast, that the business service demand bx is
different in each city because firms utilization the funds depends on the productivity
in each city. The business service demand can also be supplied by either the small
bank or the large bank at the same market clearing price. Thus, banks’ differences in
productivity deliver different revenues for the products (while the costs are assumed
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to be the same across the banks).
The consumer maximizes his/her utility by choosing whether to use internet bank-
ing or branches. The consumer’s utility of using internet banking is given following
Berry et al. (1995)
UI,t = γ0 + γ1
pI,t
pB,t
+ γ2x+ 
the consumer’s utility of using branches is given by
UB,t = γ
′
0 + γ
′
1
pI,t
pB,t
+ γ
′
2x+ 
′
where γ0, γ1, γ2, γ
′
0, γ
′
1, and γ
′
2 are parameters, x is the consumer’s probability of
access to smartphones, and  and 
′
are the type-I errors that follow an extreme value
distribution. During our sample period, consumer’s use of smartphones for inter-
net banking service increased dramatically from a near-zero base. Thus, there is a
demand-induced increase in internet banking services that must be explicitly disen-
tangled before drawing any conclusions about the bank’s incentive to supply these
services. (The share population with smartphones increased from 13% to 77% from
2009 through 2017 and the shares of internet banking users increased from 30% to
76% from 1998 through 2016. Data source: Consumers and Mobile Financial Services
and The World Bank.)
The consumer will choose internet banking if and only if
UI,t > UB,t
That is
γ0 + γ1
pI,t
pB,t
+ γ2x+  > γ
′
0 + γ
′
1
pI,t
pB,t
+ γ
′
2x+ 
′
Then
QI,t =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
(γ
′
0−γ0)+(γ
′
1−γ1)
pI,t
pB,t
+(γ
′
2−γ2)x+′
dF ()dF (
′
)
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where F () = exp(−exp(−)), F (′) = exp(−exp(−′)), the cumulative density func-
tion of the extreme value (Type-I) distribution (See the details in appendix).
Therefore the probability of choosing internet banking, QI,t, is the logistic distribu-
tion:
exp
{
(γ0 − γ′0) + (γ1 − γ′1) pI,tpB,t + (γ2 − γ
′
2)x
}
1 + exp
{
(γ0 − γ′0) + (γ1 − γ′1) pI,tpB,t + (γ2 − γ
′
2)x
}
Redefine γ0 − γ′0 = γ0, γ1 − γ′1 = γ1, γ2 − γ′2 = γ2, then QI,t is
exp
{
γ0 + γ1
pI,t
pB,t
+ γ2x
}
1 + exp
{
γ0 + γ1
pI,t
pB,t
+ γ2x
}
Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium is defined as a price for retailing service (both branch
banking and internet banking), pB,t and pI,t, prices for firm service at each location,
rL, rS, banks’ choices on the number of branches at time t in both cities, the level of in-
ternet banking and the decision to restructure at time t, {BjLC,t, BjSC,t, Ijt , Rjt}j=LB,SB,
such that
(1) Banks’ choices {BjLC,t, BjSC,t, Ijt , Rjt}j=LB,SB and the continuation values, V R
and V NR solve the banks’ optimization problems.
(2) Given banks’ choices {BjLC,t, BjSC,t, Ijt , Rjt}j=LB,SB, and the price of retailing
service provided by branches, pB,t, the retailing market for bank branch is cleared,
(1−QI,t)Dt =
∑
j=LB,SB
mj(BjLC,t +B
j
SC,t) (3.1)
where QI,t is the probability the consumer chooses internet banking.
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(3) Given banks’ choices {BjLC,t, BjSC,t, Ijt , Rjt}j=LB,SB, and the price of retailing
service provided by internet banking, pI,t, the retailing market for internet banking
is cleared,
QI,tDt =
∑
j=LB,SB
mjIjt (3.2)
(4) Given banks’ choices {BjLC,t, BjSC,t, Ijt , Rjt}j=LB,SB, and the price of firm service,
{rx}, the market of firm service is cleared (firms make zero profits),
rx = Ax
for x = LC, SC
Unexpected Recession
The starting period in the model is the year 1998. The Great Recession is cap-
tured in the model as an unexpected, negative shock to banks’ productivity, a shock
that occurs in the t = tr period of the model. As the shock is unexpected by banks
and lasts for only one time period, the banks’ policy function before and after the
shock will not change. The banks’ decisions are affected by the shock, only in the
period when the shock occurs.
In the recession, the productivity of both large and small banks are reduced by a
fraction v. Bank j’s problem at period t = tr is
max
{BjLC,tr ,B
j
SC,tr
,Ijtr ,R
j
tr
}
(1− λRjtr)
{
(1− v)mj(pB,tr(BjLC,tr +BjSC,tr) + pI,tr Ijtr)
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+
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, B−jSC,tr , I
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tr )+
(1−Rjtr)V NR(BjLC,tr , BjSC,tr , Ijtr , B−jLC,tr , B−jSC,tr , I−jtr )
}
where V R is the continuation value after restructuring and V NR is the continua-
tion value before restructuring. In the model, a bank can only restructure once. That
is, Rt = 0, if there is j > 0, Rt−j = 1.
3.3 Estimation
We use method of moments to identify the values of a set of key parameters in
the model, so that the model can explain banks’ opening and closing of branches and
adoption of internet banking before and after the Great Recession.
3.3.1 Data
We use US individual bank branch level data from 1998 to 2017 from the Summary
of Deposits (SOD) which is an annual survey of branch office deposits maintained
by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). This data set contains the
information about bank branches, including location (state, county, city), deposits in
the branch, bank name, and bank holding company name.The starting date of 1998
corresponds to the period when internet banking is tracked by the Pew Research
Center. We define large banks as those banks that belong to a bank holding company
with total deposits in the top 20% of the deposit distribution every year, and small
banks as the other remaining banks. In our sample, on average, there are about
144,980 bank-year data points, 7,249 banks every year and, of these, on average 1,450
are classified as large banks. We define large cities as metro areas that contain a core
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urban area population of 50,000 or more (following the definition used by FDIC) and
small cities as all other cities. Internet banking is defined as both online banking
and mobile banking. The data about online banking and mobile banking is from
the following sources: Survey of Consumers’ Use of Mobile Financial Services (2012-
2016) conducted by the Federal Reserve Board, Digital Banking Consumer Survey
done by PwC, Emarketer, and Bank of America. The number of internet banking
users increased by 35 times, from 10 million users in 1998 to 360 million users in
2017. The market share of internet banking is calculated as the percent of bank
service users who use internet banking to sum of the percent of bank service users
who use internet banking and the percent of bank service users who use branches
(some percent of users in the survey claim to use neither of these services). This
data is obtained from the Survey of Consumers’ Use of Mobile Financial Services
(2012-2016) and used as target moments for the model.
The market share of internet banking (online and mobile users) increased from
52% to 57% from 2012 to 2015, corresponding to a decline in branch banking from
48% to 43% during the same period. The share of smartphone users as a proportion
of the population in the US has increased dramatically from 13% in 2009 to 77% in
2017. A vast majority of these smartphone users also use banking services on their
phones. Thus an increasing share of internet banking users comprises mobile users
during this period. We explicitly model this demand-driven increase in internet bank-
ing in our calculations to estimate the effect of the bank supply of these services and
the effect of technology shocks on this supply.
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3.3.2 Computation Method
We compute banks’ policy functions, price function and the value functions. We
begin by enumerating the F.O.C of the problem. The F.O.C of the bank’s problem is
(1) F.O.C with respect to Bjx,t, ∀ x=LC,SC and j=LB,SB
mjpB,t +m
jrx − c0(
∑
x
Bjx,t)− c1
∑
j
Bjx,t − c1Bjx,t − φB(Bjx,t −Bjx,t−1)
+βφB(B
j
x,t+1 −Bjx,t) = 0
(2) F.O.C with respect to Ijt , ∀ j=LB,SB
mjpI,t − cI − φI(Ijt − Ijt−1) + βφI(Ijt+1 − Ijt ) = 0 (3.3)
From these six equations (four for the first F.O.C. and two for the second F.O.C)
we can solve for the six unknowns, Bjx,t and I
j
t . However, the above equations show
that Bjx,t and I
j
t depend on their future values, B
j
x,t+1 and I
j
t+1 respectively. We sim-
plify the computation by assuming linear policy functions. (Since the seminal papers
of Kydland and Prescott (1982) and King et al. (1988), it has become commonplace
in macroeconomics to approximate the solution to non-linear, dynamic, stochastic,
general equilibrium models using linear methods. Linear approximation methods are
useful to characterize certain aspects of the dynamic properties of complicated models
((Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2004)).) That is, banks’ decisions Bjx,t, I
j
t , are linearly
correlated with state variables Bjx,t−1, B
j
−x,t−1, B
−j
x,t−1, I
j
t−1, I
−j
t−1.
Bjx,t = α
j
x,0 + α
j
x,1B
j
x,t−1 + α
j
x,2B
j
−x,t−1 + α
j
x,3B
−j
x,t−1 + α
j
x,4I
j
t−1 + α
j
x,5I
−j
t−1 (3.4)
Ijt = θ
j
0 + θ
j
1I
j
t−1 + θ
j
2I
−j
t−1 (3.5)
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The values for αjx,k and θ
j
h are calculated by iterations. At a set of starting values
of αjx,k and θ
j
h, we compute banks’ choices B
j
x,t, I
j
t . Then, we estimate the two regres-
sions specified above (using the computed values of Bjx,t, I
j
t in the first iteration as
data) to update αjx,k and θ
j
h. Using the updated values of α
j
x,k and θ
j
h, we can now
estimate a new series of bank’s choices over time, Bjx,t, I
j
t . We iterate the above two
steps until the values of αjx,k and θ
j
h change little between iterations. The convergence
of αjx,k and θ
j
h and the high R
2 for each regression guarantee that the banks’ optimal
choices can be explained by state variables in a stable and linear fashion.
We begin by conjecturing values for pB,t and pI,t, the prices of the branch and
internet retail services. These prices will have to clear the equilibrium condition
(that equates the demand and supply of these services, outlined in equations 2.1 and
2.2) and the six F.O.C.’s for each period, enumerated above.
• Step 1: We first find the values for α and θ in equations 3.3 and 3.4. We begin
the process with a conjecture for α and θ
• Step 2: With a given α and θ from Step 1, we find the value of pB,t and pI,t.
We begin the process with a conjecture for pB,t and pI,t
– We replace Bjx,t+1 in equation 3.1 using the policy function given by equa-
tion 3.3 and replace Ijt+1 in equation 3.2 using the policy function given by
equation 3.4.
– We use equations 3.1 and 3.2 to solve Bjx,t and I
j
t and thus calculate the
supply of the branch and internet banking retail service across cities and
banks. Summing up both these services across all cities and banks pro-
vides us with the aggregate supply that equals aggregate demand of the
representative consumer (assuming the system is in equilibrium).
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– Using the aggregate demand function of the representative consumer (equa-
tion 2.1 and 2.2 in which Dt is replaced with equation x.y), we can solve
for the prices pB,t and pI,t. We then compare these two solved prices with
our conjectured prices at the beginning of this step.
– We then update the values for pB,t and pI,t and repeat Step 2. We continue
this iteration process until the the successive values of pB,t and pI,t converge
to a pre-specified tolerance.
• Step 3: We now re-estimate the regressions in equation 3.3 and 3.4 (adding the
new estimated values of Bjx,t and I
j
t to the sample) and update the values of
α and θ. We then use the new values of α and θ and repeat Step 2. We stop
when successive values of α and θ converge to a pre-specified tolerance.
The computation of value functions uses the contraction mapping theorem by
iteration as the standard. However, there are two differences from the standard
steps. The first difference is that we first compute the banks’ continuation value after
restructuring (which occurs only once in the model) and, using these values to solve
for the banks’ choices of restructuring, compute the banks’ continuation values before
restructuring. At each set of values of the state variables (the branch and internet
banking choices of the banks and their competitors), banks compare the benefit and
cost of restructuring and make decisions accordingly. The second difference is that
we assume the policy function is a linear function of the state variables (equations 3.3
and 3.4) rather than re-solving the market clearing conditions at each set of values of
state variables, when computing the value functions.
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3.3.3 Estimation Results
We use the simulated method of moments to identify the values of parameters in
the model. The parameter in the adjustment costs of bank branches φB is identified
from how fast banks closed branches from 2010 through 2016. The parameter in the
adjustment costs of internet banking φI is identified from the percentage change in
internet banking users from 1998 to 2009. The parameter that captures competi-
tion of large and small banks c1 is identified from the difference in changes of bank
branches in metropolitan areas and nonmetropolitan areas from 1998 through 2009.
The parameter that measures banks’ marginal costs of maintaining branches c0 is
identified from the difference in the number of branches opened by large banks be-
tween large and small cities from 1998 through 2009. The cost of internet banking
cI is identified from the increase of internet banking after 2010. The parameters of
consumers’ preferences γ1, γ2 are identified from the share of internet banking from
2012 through 2015. In the data, we see that the number of internet banking users
increased faster after the recession; therefore, banks chose to restructure during the
recession. The parameter that measures the costs of restructuring λ is identified from
this fact. The parameter measures the degree of recession v is jointly identified from
the restructure choices and the number of branches in 2010. The discounting factor
β is set to .97. The value of ρ is normalized to 1. (We can normalize this parameter
to 1 because the consumer’s preference y1 already captures the substituting rate of
internet banking and branches.) The parameter γ0 is normalized to 0. The parameter
D is normalized to 50. The values of parameters are in Table 3.2 and the comparison
of data and model moments is in Table 3.3.
The model does a reasonable job in explaining the data. We set the first period
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of the model to the year 1998 in the data. That is, we take the average number
of branches of a large bank, of a small bank in a large city, and of a small bank in
a small city in 1998 as the starting values of the model. The number of branches
increases/decreases gradually at a linear trend; therefore, we do not need to match
all the points in each year period. We just need to match the critical points that
include the number of branches in 2009 (when the number of branches peaked), the
number of branches in 2010 (when the recession decreased banks’ productivity), the
number of branches in 2016 (the last period in the data), the increased percentage
of internet banking from 1998 through 2009 (the time periods before the restructure)
and the increased percentage of internet banking from 2010 through 2016 (the time
periods after the restructure). The first group of moments is the number of branches
for a large bank in a large city, a large bank in a small city, and a small bank in a
small city in 2009. In the model, in 2009, the number of branches for a large bank in
a large city is 8.4 (vs 8.24 in the data); the number of branches for a large bank in a
small city is 2.41 (vs 2.56 in the data); the number of branches for a small bank in a
large city is 2.17 (vs 2.27 in the data); the number of branches for a small bank in a
small city is 1.83 (vs 1.71 in the data). The second group of moments is the number
of branches for a large bank in a large city, a large bank in a small city, and a small
bank in a small city in 2010. In the model, in 2010, the number of branches for a large
bank in a large city is 7.87 (vs 8.91 in the data); the number of branches for a large
bank in a small city is 1.9 (vs 2.25 in the data); the number of branches for a small
bank in a large city is 2.22 (vs 2.59 in the data); the number of branches for a small
bank in a small city is 1.73 (vs 1.7 in the data).The third group of moments is the
number of branches for a large bank in a large city, a large bank in a small city, and
a small bank in a small city in 2016. In the model, in 2016, the number of branches
for a large bank in a large city is 8.31 (vs 8.57 in the data); the number of branches
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for a large bank in a small city is 2.22 (vs 2.49 in the data); the number of branches
for a small bank in a large city is 2.1 (vs 1.98 in the data); the number of branches
for a small bank in a small city is 1.78 (vs 1.62 in the data).The fourth group of
moments includes the percentage of increase of internet banking from 1998 through
2009 and from 2010 through 2016. From 1998 through 2009, the unit of internet
banking increased by 13 times (vs 14 times in the data) and from 2010 through 2016,
the unit of internet banking increased by 0.97 times (vs 0.9 times in the data).
The estimation of the model shows that the cost of building up branches is one-
eighth the cost of building up internet banking before the Great Recession. That is
why, before the Great Recession, banks chose to build up branches to increase their
supply of retail service. However, However, as the cost of providing a unit of retail
service using internet banking is less than 2.5% as great as the cost of using branches,
after the recession banks started to close branches and increased their rate of building
up internet banking.
Branches will not disappear, though. Branches are used by banks to serve firms.
The model shows that it is very profitable to keep branches and that the profits of
having a branch in a large city are twice those of a bank in a small city. Therefore, af-
ter the recession, large banks close more branches in small cities compared to in large
cities. However, the situation is very different for small banks. Although revenues
are high from branches in large cities, the competition costs in large cities are also
high. On average, both large and small banks have 10 branches in a large city but
they have only 4 branches in a small city. Therefore, the competition costs in large
cities are 2.5 times as high as in small cities. Most importantly, these competition
costs account for 50% of banks’ total costs of maintaining branches. Therefore, as
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small banks are not productive enough as to compete with large banks in large cities,
they close a larger percentage of branches in large cities after the recession compared
to large banks (the productivity of a small bank is as half as that of a large bank)
compared to those closed by large banks because the productivity of a small bank is
half that of a large bank. As small banks closed many branches, their marginal costs
of having additional branch in small cities decrease, so they do not close as many
branches in small cities as in large cities.
The model shows that restructuring will cost a bank 45% of its current profits.
However, the recession lowers the cost of restructuring by at least 50%. Therefore,
the restructure in 2010 accelerated large banks’ adoption of internet banking since
then. The model shows that, in 2016, the unit of internet banking is 47.3. How-
ever, suppose there is no restructure in 2010; the unit would be 30.3. This means
that the restructuring increases the unit of internet banking in 2016 by 56%. The
share of internet banking in 2016 would be 48% if there were no restructuring; it
was 60% when restructuring happened in 2016. The average price of retail service in
2016 thus decreases by 37%, from 0.41 (without restructure in 2016) to 0.26 (with
restructure in 2016) (The average price of retail service equals sum of the share of
branch banking times the price of branch banking and the share of internet banking
times the price of internet banking.) The decrease in the price of retail service comes
from two parts: first, expensive branch banking is replaced by internet banking; sec-
ond, internet banking itself becomes cheaper after the restructure. In 2016, the price
of using a unit of branch banking is 0.62 and the price of using a unit of internet
banking is 0.0074, which is less than 2% of that of branch banking. Because of the
restructure, the share of internet banking in 2016 increases from 48% to 60%. If the
share of internet banking had stayed at 48% instead of 60%, the average price of retail
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service would be 0.33. Therefore, the replacement of branches by internet banking
itself contributes to 53% of the price drop. The drop of the price of internet banking
thus accounts for 47% of the price reduction.
However, there are costs from the cleansing effect for firms in small cities. As
banks replace branches with internet banking, some firms receive fewer loans. With-
out the cleansing effect and restructuring, in 2016, on average both large banks and
small banks in small cities would have 4.1 branches in total. With the cleansing effect
and restructuring, in 2016, on average both large banks and small banks in small
cities would have 4 branches in total. Therefore, the cleansing effect reduces loans to
firms in small cities by 2.5% in 2016.
3.4 Conclusions
In this paper, we study the cleansing effect of the Great Recession. We first use
a difference in differences empirical framework to show that, in states hit hard by
the recession, consumers adopted more internet banking. We exclude the concern
that recession lowers consumers’ income and, thus, they adopt cheaper methods of
banking. Therefore, we conclude that the recession makes banks accelerate their
adoption of internet banking. Next, we use a structural model to quantify the costs
of restructuring and to evaluate the welfare implications of the cleansing effect for
retail consumers and firms in large and small cities. We find that the price of retail
service is lowered by about 37%; however, firms in small cities receive fewer loans
from banks.
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Table 3.1: Description of Parameters and Variables
This table shows the description for each parameter and variable.
Parameter Description
c1 competition costs
c0 marginal costs of branches
cI marginal costs of internet banking
φB adjustment costs of branches
φI adjustment costs of internet banking
AL large city’s productivity
AS small city’s productivity
mLB large bank’s productivity
mSB small bank’s productivity
λ restructure costs
v negative shock to banks’ productivity
γ0 preference parameter
γ1 consumer’s price sensitivity
γ2 preference with smart-phone effect
Bjx,t bank j’s branches at city x at time t
serve firms at city x and retail customers at both cities
Ijt bank j’s internet banking at time t
serve retail customers at both cities
Rjt bank j’s restructuring choice at time t
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Table 3.2: Values of Parameters and Targeted Moments
This table shows the values for each parameter.We use the simulated method of moments to identify
the values of parameters in the model. The parameter in the adjustment costs of bank branches φB
is identified from how fast banks closed branches from 2010 through 2016. The parameter in the
adjustment costs of internet banking φI is identified from the percentage change in internet banking
users from 1998 to 2009. The parameter that captures competition of large and small banks c1 is
identified from the difference in changes of bank branches in metropolitan areas and nonmetropolitan
areas from 1998 through 2009. The parameter that measures banks’ marginal costs of maintaining
branches c0 is identified from the difference in the number of branches opened by large banks between
large and small cities from 1998 through 2009. The cost of internet banking cI is identified from
the increase of internet banking after 2010. The parameters of consumers’ preferences γ1, γ2 are
identified from the share of internet banking from 2012 through 2015. In the data, we see that
the number of internet banking users increased faster after the recession; therefore, banks chose
to restructure during the recession. The parameter that measures the costs of restructuring λ is
identified from this fact. The parameter measures the degree of recession v is jointly identified from
the restructure choices and the number of branches in 2010. The discounting factor β is set to .97.
The value of ρ is normalized to 1. The parameter gamma0 is normalized to 0.
Parameter Description Value Moments
c1 competition between banks .2 large and small
(.0015) banks’ branch growth (reduction) rate
c0 marginal costs of branches .28 large and small
(.0018) banks’ branch growth (reduction) rate
cI marginal costs .00004 banks’ internet banking
of internet banking (.0032) growth rate
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Parameter Description Value Moments
φB adjustment costs of branches 2.4 branch closure after 2010
(.0016)
φI adjustment costs of internet banking 18 internet banking growth rate
(.13)
ALC large city’s productivity 2.02 large cities’ branches
(.016)
ASC small city’s productivity 1.03 small cities’ branches
(.0036)
mLB large bank’s productivity 2.54 large banks’ branches
(.0071)
mSB small bank’s productivity 1.36 small banks’ branches
(.0011)
γ0 normalized 0
γ1 price sensitivity -2.5 increase in internet banking
(.013)
γ2 smart-phone effect .45 share of internet banking
(.0047)
v negative shock to banks’ productivity .5 branches in 2010
and restructure choices
λ restructure costs .45 banks’ restructure choices
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Table 3.3: Comparison of Moments in the Data and in the Model
This table shows the values for data moments and model moments. The model does a reasonable
job in explaining the data. We set the first period of the model to the year 1998 in the data.
That is, we take the average number of branches of a large bank, of a small bank in a large city,
and of a small bank in a small city in 1998 as the starting values of the model. The number of
branches increases/decreases gradually at a linear trend; therefore, we do not need to match all the
points in each year period. We just need to match the critical points that include the number of
branches in 2009 (when the number of branches peaked), the number of branches in 2010 (when
the recession decreased banks’ productivity), the number of branches in 2016 (the last period in the
data), the increased percentage of internet banking from 1998 through 2009 (the time periods before
the restructure) and the increased percentage of internet banking from 2010 through 2016 (the time
periods after the restructure).
Panel A: Bank Branches
moment data model
2009 2010 2017 2009 2010 2017
large bank
branches in a large city 8.24 8.92 8.57 8.4 7.87 8.31
branches in a small city 2.56 2.59 2.50 2.41 2.22 2.22
small bank
branches in a large city 2.27 2.25 1.98 2.17 1.90 2.1
branches in a small city 1.71 1.70 1.62 1.83 1.74 1.78
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Panel B: Internet Banking
data
from 1998 to 2009 from 2010 to 2017
Increase in the amount 14.3 .9
2012 2013 2014 2015
share of internet banking (%) 52.3 55.4 55.6 56.5
model
Increase in the amount from 1998 to 2009 from 2010 to 2017
14.2 0.97
share of internet banking (%) 2012 2013 2014 2015
58.9 59.1 59.1 59.6
47
Table 3.4: Summary of Statistics
This table compares the statistics of the states hit by recession and the states not hit by recession.
We define a state as heavily hit by the recession if it had an increase in unemployment above the
median level of 5.3% from from January 2008 through January 2010. In the data, we can only see if
the income level belongs to a certain range, not the absolute dollar amounts. I define high-income
consumers as consumers with annual income more than 100,000 dollars. In the data set, about 10%
of consumers have high income. The variable education is defined as 1 if the consumer has less than a
1st grade education; as 2 if the consumer completed 1st, 2nd, 3rd, or 4th grade; as 3 if the consumer
completed 5th or 6th grade; as 4 if the consumer completed 7th or 8th grade; as 5 if the consumer
completed 9th grade; as 6 if the consumer completed 10th grade; as 7 if the consumer completed 11th
grade; as 8 if the consumer attended 12th grade but received no diploma; as 9 if the consumer has a
high school diploma or the equivalent (for example, a GED); as 10 if the consumer has some college
but no degree; as 11 if the consumer has an associate degree in a college occupational/vocational
program; as 12 if the consumer has an associate degree in a college academic program; as 13 if the
consumer has a bachelors degree (for example, BA, AB, or BS); as 14 if the consumer has a masters
degree; as 15 if the consumer has a professional school degree (for example, MD, DDS, DVM, LLB,
JD); and as 16 if the consumer has a doctoral degree (for example, PhD, EdD). A white consumer
is indicated as 1. Employment status is defined as 1 if the consumer is employed and otherwise as
0. Marital status is defined as 1 if married and otherwise as 0. Gender is defined as 1 if male and
otherwise as 0. In Table.6, I compare the income, age, marital status, education, gender, race, and
employment status of the people surveyed from the hit states and the not-hit states.
2008-2010
states hit by recession states not hit by recession
age 46.6 44.7
education 10.5 10.5
percent of high income 0.14 0.14
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male 0.48 0.48
white 0.73 0.75
married 0.6 0.65
employed 0.78 0.82
internet banking adoption 0.7 0.7
2011-2013
states hit by recession states not hit by recession
age 47.2 46.7
education 10.6 10.5
percent of high income 0.19 0.21
male 0.47 0.49
white 0.75 0.74
married 0.62 0.63
employed 0.59 0.63
internet banking adoption 0.74 0.78
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Table 3.5: Recessions and Internet Banking Usage
Internet banking usage
Probit Model Logit Model
Crisis hit .066∗∗∗ .12∗∗∗
(.007) (.012)
High income .20∗∗∗ .39∗∗∗
(.006) (.011)
Education .16∗∗∗ .28∗∗∗
(.001) (.002)
Age −.013∗∗∗ −.021∗∗∗
(.0001) (.0002)
White race .31∗∗∗ .52∗∗∗
(.004) (.007)
Male −.014∗∗∗ −.029∗∗∗
(.004) (.006)
Employed .28∗∗∗ .48∗∗∗
(.005) (.008)
Married .33∗∗∗ .55∗∗∗
(.004) (.007)
Pseudo R-square 0.12 0.12
Number of Observations 576,395
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Chapter 4
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND SMALL BUSINESS LENDING
This paper evaluates the negative effects of information technology (IT) improvements
on small business lending and what can be done to combat this trend if necessary.
Three challenges lie in the identification. First, in the data, we cannot see the demand
for small business loans and banks’ willingness to lend to small business borrowers.
Therefore, it is hard to establish casual effect between IT improvements and decline
of lending to small businesses. Second, a bank’s costs of IT is a choice variable for the
bank as well as lending to small businesses. These two variables are probably affected
by the same unobserved characters of the bank. For example, when a bank faces
pressure from Stress Test, it may decrease lending to risky small business borrowers.
Thus, the bank has lower information processing costs for a dollar of loans as banks
have economy of scale in processing larger loans. Third, the decomposition of two
mechanisms suggested will give quantitative answers to a question that has attracted
much attention, but remains unsolved in the literature: to what degree, the consoli-
dation has contributed to the decline of small business lending. As the consolidation
may also be caused by IT improvements, it is not easy to quantify the contribution
from the consolidation without a theory or an instrument variable. Because of these
identification problems, I evaluate the effect from IT improvement on small business
loans with a general equilibrium structural framework. This framework can also be
used to evaluate policies that may encourage small business lending.
I build a dynamic model of relationship banking. In the model, I distinguish be-
tween relationship lending and transaction lending. Transaction lending is an “arm’s
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length” transaction based on hard information about a borrower. In comparison, rela-
tionship lending is based on a borrower’s hard information as well as soft information.
As noted by Liberti and Petersen (2017), hard information is machine readable and
quantifiable, but soft information is usually subjective, and its collection and evalua-
tion are usually not separable and is expensive to collect. Therefore I assume that it
is expensive for banks to build relationships with borrowers. Small business borrow-
ers are modeled as risky borrowers. Small borrowers are risky for banks because of
insufficient credit histories and low credit scores (according to the 2017 Small Busi-
ness Credit Survey). For banks, lending to small borrowers is less profitable than
lending to established businesses (Mills and McCarthy, 2016). However, a bank can
improve the returns from these borrowers by monitoring their cash flow and restruc-
turing delinquent loans promptly (Bolton et al., 2016). In the model, lending with
additional monitoring through bank-borrower relationships is relationship lending.
Consequently, risky small borrowers are more likely to receive relationship loans than
transaction loans (Boot and Thakor, 2000) 1 . The dynamic features of the model are
built on Hopenhayn (1992). In the model, banks decide to grow or exit according to
the advancing rate of lending technology and the competition in the deposit market.
The bank size distribution is thus endogenous to IT improvements.
The model suggests two mechanisms by which IT improvements can reduce the
amount of small business lending: a substitution effect between transaction and rela-
tionship lending and a crowding-out effect between large and small banks. Liberti and
Petersen (2017) find that IT improvements favor the collection of hard information
1This assumption is a simplification of the reality. It does not mean that lending to large cor-
porations requires no bank-borrower relationships at all. The conclusion in the model still holds as
long as lending to small businesses more depends on bank-borrower relationships, which is suggested
by Chodorow-Reich (2013).
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over soft information. I assume therefore that the cost of acquiring hard information
decreases, but that the acquisition of soft information is as expensive as before 2 .
As a consequence, banks’ profits from transaction lending increase more than those
from relationship lending. Banks thus decrease the share of relationship loans in their
portfolios. The second effect is the crowding-out effect, in which larger banks with
smaller shares of small business lending gain market share. IT improvement increases
the lending capacity of large banks more than that of small banks. IT improvement
also intensifies competition in the deposit market and increases the cost of deposits.
Small banks that face high costs of staying in the market will become less profitable
and choose to exit. Overall, the share of small business lending declines. In both
situations, if banks cannot increase their lending capacity enough, lending to small
businesses falls.
I estimate the model with the U.S. individual commercial bank data from 2002
to 2007 and from 2012 to 2017 3 . I find that the technological advancements con-
tribute to 58% of the small business decline in the US. I identify a set of parameters
for which the simulated moments from the model are quantitatively consistent with
the observed behavior of U.S. commercial banks. I use the moments of banks’ total
loans from 2002 to 2017 to identify the advancement rate of lending technology. From
this identification, I link IT improvements to bank productivity growth. Using the
2The assumption is a simplification of reality where the cost of acquiring hard information de-
creases faster than the cost of acquiring soft information. As is in Liberti and Petersen (2017), “Hard
information is quantitative, easy to store and transmit in impersonal ways, and its information con-
tent is independent of the collection process. Technology has changed and continues to change the
way we collect, process, and communicate information. This has fundamentally transformed the way
financial markets and institutions operate. One of these changes is a greater reliance on hard relative
to soft information in financial transactions. This has altered the design of financial institutions by
moving decisions outside the traditional boundaries of organization.”
3I exclude data during the recessions because my model cannot explain fluctuations in the banking
sector. However, my model does show that IT improvements makes banks to issue transaction
lending to riskier borrowers and thus increases the risk in the pool of transaction lending.
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share and amount of small business loans in 2002, I identify the parameters of banks’
technology for building relationships. The identification shows that there is an in-
creasing marginal cost of building additional relationships. This finding is consistent
with Chen et al. (2004), who find that financial institutions have decreasing returns
to scale in non-routine tasks. The model does a reasonable job of fitting the data.
The total bank loans increased from $5.16 to 8.62 trillion from 2002 to 2017 (vs from
$5.11 to $8.54 trillion in the data). The un-targeted moments in the data is the cost of
processing a dollar amount of loans, which decreased by 16% from 2012 to 2017 in the
model (vs 16% in the data). The share of small business loans is 6.7% for all banks,
and 5.4% for large banks (with loan more than 1 billion dollars) in 2002 (vs 6.7%
and 5.1% in the data); small business loans are $346 billion in the model (vs $340
billion in the data) in 2002. The estimated model shows that small business loans
decreased from $346 to $322 billion dollars because of IT improvement from 2002 to
2017. This identification strategy solves the challenges mentioned above because I
do not identify the values of each parameter by targeting at the moments about the
change of small business loans.
The model shows that the substitution effect contributes to at least 63% of the
decline in the model, while the crowding-out effect contributes to at most 37%. In the
quantitative model, the costs of processing each dollar of a transaction loan decreased
by 46%, from $0.0144 in 2002 to $0.0078 in 2017. This decrease is large in comparison
with the average loan spread of about 3%. However, for each dollar of a relationship
loan, the bank needs to pay at least an additional $0.0066 to build relationships, so
the cost of relationship lending is reduced by at most 31%. Because the returns to
banks are larger from transaction lending than from relationship lending, they sub-
stitute from relationship loans to transaction loans. In the model, the loan share of
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large banks with loans totaling more than $1 billion increased from 76% to 86% (vs
from 81% to 90% in the data) from 2002 to 2017; the share of small business loans
decreased from 6.7% to 3.6% for all banks, but for large banks (with loan more than
1 billion dollars), it decreased from 5.4% to 2% (vs 5.1% to 3% in the data) from 2002
to 2017. Because large banks have smaller shares of small business loans, lending to
small businesses declines.
There are debates about the desirability and effectiveness of policies to encour-
age lending to small businesses. A structural framework can be better for conducting
counter-factual policy analysis, compared to a reduced-form approach. With my
quantitative structural model, I compare three policies: subsidizing lending to risky
small borrowers; subsidizing small banks with fewer than 100 million dollars of loans;
and reducing banks’ staying costs. A dollar of subsidy of $100 to small business
lending increases small business lending by $79 as this policy reduces the substitution
effect. However, a dollar of subsidy of $100 to small bank’s lending increases small
business lending by $0 because, even if this policy decreases the crowding-out effect
as is suggested by Berger et al. (2005), it increases the substitution effect. Bordo and
Duca (2018) suggest that we should reduce the regulatory burden on banks to reduce
the exit of small banks and to increase lending to small businesses. I find that when
small banks’ (with fewer than $100 million loans) staying costs are reduced by $1
out of $100, lending to small businesses increases by $0.002. Therefore the policy of
reducing banks’ regulatory burden (for example, the repeal of the Dodd-Frank Act)
may increase lending to small businesses, but not that much.
The paper contributes to literature by providing a general equilibrium frame-
work to evaluate the consequences of technological advances and banking policies.
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The general equilibrium framework well addresses the competition among banks and
banks’ endogenous adoption of new technology, which are the challenges to relate IT
improvement and banks’ productivity growth. The general equilibrium framework
allows me to better evaluate the casual relationship between the consolidation and
the decline of small business lending when natural experiments are not available for
empirical work (Berger and Udell, 2002). The framework also considers the ratio-
nal expectations of banks and the competition among large and small banks when
evaluating policies. Thereby, I arrive at quantitatively different results from previous
empirical work.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I is the contributions to
literature. Section II presents key statistical features of the U.S. commercial banking
market. Section III contains the model. Section IV presents the estimation of the
model. Section V shows implications of the model. Section VI concludes. Proofs and
tables are in the Appendix.
4.1 Contributions to Literature
First, this paper contributes to the recent literature on the decline in small busi-
ness lending. Two pioneering studies (Corte´s et al., 2018; Bordo and Duca, 2018) try
to attribute this reduction to the increasing regulatory burden created by the Dodd-
Frank Act, but they arrive at conflicting results. Bordo and Duca (2018) find that
this policy makes it more difficult for small banks to survive, and that the increased
regulatory burden has contributed to the decline in small business lending in the U.S.
However, Corte´s et al. (2018) do not find any positive correlations. Therefore it is
not entirely clear why small business lending has declined. My paper offers an alter-
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native explanation: improvements in information technology. I show that this factor
may have contributed to a major part of the decline. Using this framework with IT
improvements, I conduct policy experiments and find that when policy reduces the
regulatory burden of small banks, lending to small businesses may increase little.
Second, this paper contributes to the literature on banking market consolidation
and small business lending (Berger et al., 1998; Strahan and Weston, 1998; Peek and
Rosengren, 1995; Berger et al., 2017). Berger et al. (2005) and Berger et al. (2017)
find that small banks still play a significant role in lending to small business and sug-
gest that consolidation in the U.S. banking market may contribute to the decline in
small business lending (also refer to Berger and Udell (2002) for a summary of related
research). However, other studies find that the exit of small banks decreases or does
not affect lending to small risky borrowers. My study finds that the consolidation
is only correlated with the decline in small business lending, but does not cause the
decline. Both bank consolidation and the decline in small business lending are the
result of IT improvements. Therefore, when we use a regression to establish a causal
relationship between greater banking market concentration and the decline in small
business loans, we may have the problem of omitted variables and establish a false
causal relationship.
Third, this paper contributes to studies of technological improvements and pro-
ductivity growth in the U.S. banking industry. Berger (2003) summarizes the dif-
ficulties of relating information technology improvements to observed productivity
growth. First, firms may not adopt the best available technology. Second, produc-
tivity growth may not increase firms’ profits, but instead benefit consumers through
competition among firms. This study tackles this challenge by using a quantitative
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structural model that endogenizes the adoption of advanced technologies and compe-
tition among banks. I find that productivity in the banking sector grew by 46% from
2002 to 2017 due to IT improvements.
Fourth, this paper contributes to the literature on industry “shake-out.” The re-
search on industry shake-out suggests that with the introduction of cost-saving tech-
nology, small firms exit and large firms gain market share (Hopenhayn, 1992; Hayashi
et al., 2017). Hayashi et al. (2017) show that the ATM market becomes more con-
centrated because large firms benefit more than small firms from the introduction of
ATMs that accommodate debit cards. When the technology used in transaction lend-
ing improves, there is a shake-out in the banking market. Consistent with this study,
transaction loans to safe borrowers in my model are similar to ATMs, and these safe
borrowers receive more loans. By enriching the previous framework of shake-out with
an alternative product—relationship lending, and with alternative borrowers—risky
borrowers, I find that shake-out can be welfare-decreasing for these risky borrowers.
This finding is different from the conclusions of previous research as I introduce dif-
ferent production technologies that improve at different rates.
4.2 Model
In this section, I construct an infinite-horizon model with discrete time periods.
The economy is populated with borrowers and commercial banks (“banks” hence-
forth). Borrowers have no preference or behaviors in the model. A borrower lives
for one period. A borrower has a project that needs $1 dollar of financing from a
bank. His delinquency rate is unknown to banks. Banks take deposits and issue loans
to maximize expected discounted profits. Banks have productive assets for assessing
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borrowers’ delinquency rates. The evaluation of a borrower’s delinquency rate is a
statistical analysis, which is based on borrowers’ hard information. Banks can also
choose to invest in long-term relationships with borrowers to learn about changes in
the borrower’s financial condition, and to adapt lending terms to the evolving cir-
cumstances of the firm (Rajan, 1992; Von Thadden, 1995; Bolton et al., 2016). In
their models, the bank-borrower relationship gives the bank an option to restructure
the debt when the borrower is delinquent and thereby increase the bank’s returns.
I model relationship banking by simplifying Bolton et al. (2016): banks have
higher returns from a delinquent borrower in relationship lending than in transaction
lending. Hence, risky borrowers receive relationship lending and safe borrowers re-
ceive transaction lending. I add two features to Bolton et al. (2016): first, a bank’s
marginal cost of building an additional relationship is increasing in the amount of rela-
tionships built; second, a bank can accumulate assets in order to grow and can choose
to exit. Over time, the technology of assessing hard information improves relative to
the technology of building relationships. As banks have increasing marginal costs of
building additional relationships, banks find it more profitable to switch to transac-
tion lending from relationship lending when IT improves. As banks gain economy of
scale in accumulating assets, IT improvements allow larger banks to grow faster and
gain market share. Because IT improvements also intensify the competition in the
deposit market and increase the cost of deposits, smaller banks cannot afford to stay
and may choose to exit.
I do not model borrowers’ behaviors or choices. Some may argue that improve-
ments in IT allow borrower to search more efficiently for the best loan offers, and that
therefore advanced information technology will promote matching between banks and
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borrowers. I model the efficiency improvements of matching between borrowers and
banks from the perspective of banks. In the model, advanced information technology
allows banks to evaluate more borrowers, which leads to more efficient matching be-
tween banks and borrowers.
4.2.1 Model Details
Time Line : There are infinite periods t = 0, 1, 2, .... In each period t, there
are four dates, d = 0, 1, 2, 3. On date zero, a bank assesses borrowers. On date
1, based on a borrower’s delinquency rate, the bank decides whether to lend to the
borrower. If the bank chooses to lend to the borrower, the bank decides by rela-
tionship or transaction lending. On date 2, the bank receives the return from its
loan. On date 3, after seeing its cost to stay for the next period, the bank decides
whether to stay in the market and decides the amount of its assets for the next period.
Preference and endowments : Banks are risk neutral and are endowed with
assets for evaluating borrowers. Borrowers have projects, but no money to invest in
them.
Types of securities are risky bank loans and riskless deposits. A bank issues
a loan of $1 to finance a borrower’s project. The borrower and his project exist for
one period. Borrowers differ in the delinquency rates of θ, θ ∈ [0, 1]. If the borrower
repays on time, the payoff to the bank is RH , the sum of principal and interest.
If the borrower is delinquent on his debt, the bank receives different returns from
transaction and relationship lending. In transaction lending, the bank liquidates the
borrower’s project and receives the liquidation value, RL. In relationship lending, the
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bank can restructure the debt and receives a higher return, RR, RR > RL. I abstract
from the process of debt restructuring in Bolton et al. (2016), as this part is not
relevant to my results. In the model, loan rates are exogenously given. If banks price
loans according to borrowers’ risk, the results of the model will not change. As infor-
mation technology improves, banks will increase their loan rates to risky borrowers
and these risky borrowers will not be able to profit from borrowing from banks. Sim-
ilarly, risky borrowers who receive relationship loans will still be hurt by technology
improvements. Deposits are from a competitive deposit market with an increasing
supply function, r = RH − e−nrlog(D), where r is the deposit interest rate, D is the
supply of deposits, and nr measures the elasticity between the deposit supply and
the deposit interest rate. When the deposit rate increases, the supply of deposits
increases.
Return from a relationship loan :
qR(θ) = (1− θ)RH + θRR − r
Return from a transaction loan :
qT (θ) = (1− θ)RH + θRL − r
On date 0, measure of B newborn banks enter the market. A newborn bank has
assets z0, which is drawn from a log-gamma distribution, log − gamma(µz, σz). All
borrowers apply to all banks (the incumbents and the new entrants). At this time,
banks have no information about borrowers’ delinquency rates.
On date 1, banks use their assets to determine the delinquency rates of borrowers
at no cost. The number of borrowers evaluated by a bank is determined by banks’
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technology and the bank’s assets in this period. The rationale behind this number is
an optimal decision by the bank. The bank decided on the amount of its assets for
this period in the previous period and cannot make any changes thereafter. Given
a bank’s assets and the current technology, the bank decides how many borrowers
to evaluate. The bank will make the maximum profit if it uses all of its assets to
evaluate borrowers. A bank with assets zt determines the delinquency rates of mt
borrowers,
mt = Mtz
α
t
, where α ∈ (0, 1) measures the return to the scale in banks’ technology of assessing
borrowers’ hard information and Mt = e
λMt−1. The parameter M0 measures banks’
technology at period 0 and λ measures the advancement of bank’s technology of each
period.
A bank chooses whom to lend to and whether to use a relationship or transaction
loan based on the delinquency rates of borrowers. If a bank makes a relationship loan
to a borrower, it pays a cost c to build a relationship with the borrower. The cost of
building a relationship is an increasing function of how many relationships the bank
builds, where c(LS) = 1
F (ω+1)
(LS)ω, LS is the number of relationships that the bank
builds, ω captures the elasticity between marginal costs of building relationships and
the number of relationships, and F measures the average costs of building relation-
ships. In the data, large banks have smaller shares of small business loans (relative
to total loans), therefore, ω > 0. Hence in the model, banks have greater decreasing
return to scale of lending to small business borrowers, compared to lending to large
corporations. This is equivalent to say that banks have some fixed costs of making
loans.
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The process of building relationships is as follows: the bank manager sends loan
officers to collect soft information about a borrower, such as his managerial ability,
the condition of his business, and his reputation among neighbors. With this infor-
mation collected, the loan officer can better monitor the cash flow from the borrower’s
project. During the process, a loan officer may neglect his responsibilities. Thus the
manager needs to monitor and incentivize the loan officers. Because a manager has
limited time, if he monitors many loan officers he cannot monitor them as efficiently
as managers who monitor only a few loan officers. In this case the manager needs
to give his loan officers even more incentives. When a bank has many borrowers to
build relationships with, it hires many loan officers. Hence a bank has an increasing
marginal cost of building relationships. Chen et al. (2004) show that financial institu-
tions have decreasing returns to scale in managing portfolios, especially in non-routine
tasks that require employees’ subjective judgments. Building relationships to acquire
borrowers’ soft information is a task of this type.
On date 2, a bank earns its profits from all the loans he finances. If a borrower
repays on time, the bank receives RH , , the sum of principal plus interest. If the
borrower is delinquent on the debt, the bank decides whether to liquidate his project
or restructure his debt. In transaction lending, the bank liquidates the project and
receives the liquidation value, RL. In relationship lending, the bank has the option
to restructure the debt and receives RR, a higher amount than the liquidation value.
Think about two types of loans: a mortgage loan and a loan to a high-tech start-up.
For both, if the borrower repays on time, the lender receives the principal and interest.
In the case of a mortgage, after issuing the loan, the lender seldom has contact with
the borrower; if the borrower does not repay on time, the lender will repossess the
house and sell it, usually at a discounted price. In the case of a loan to a high-tech
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start-up, after issuing the loan, the lender will contact the firm’s CEO frequently so
as to monitor the firm’s cash flow, innovation activities, and management decisions.
If the firm does not repay the bank on time, the lender usually knows the reason for
the delinquency. If the bank and the firm’s CEO agree on the firm’s business plan,
the bank will continue its financing; otherwise, the bank will negotiate with the lender
to get some of its money back. This process is debt restructuring, which increases
banks’ returns.
On date 3, after the cost of staying, et, is known, the bank decides whether to
stay and decides its assets for the next period, zt+1 if stays,
zt+1 = (1− δz)zt + Az1−γt gγt
where et is from a log-gamma distribution log − gamma(µ, σ), gt is the money used
for assets accumulation, δz is the depreciation rate of assets, A and γ are constant
parameters, and 0 < γ < 1. The parameter A, the bank’s assets, zt and the technol-
ogy for assessing borrowers determine the bank’s return from the investment of gt.
The money used for investment is borrowed from future profits. The model assumes
that banks can borrow from another debt market besides deposit market to finance
its investment in IT. Banks with more assets, has larger returns from this investment.
When making the investment on productive assets, banks need to trade off the cost of
this borrowing and the benefit to its continuation value, which depends on the current
level of its assets. As a result, when the technology for evaluating borrowers is im-
proving, the return gaps between large and small banks increase. Large banks benefit
more from technological improvements than small banks. The process by which banks
accumulate assets can also be seen as a process of banks utilizing new technology.
Large banks are assumed to be better at utilizing new technology than small banks.
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People find that large banks have usually been first to adopt advanced technologies
and benefit more from the adoption (Berger, 2003). For example, the transaction
website adoption rate varied greatly by bank size. By the end of 2001, 100% of the
largest banks (banks with over $10 billion in assets) had transaction websites, while
29.1% of the smallest banks (with assets below $100 million) had transaction websites.
Bank’s Decisions
The bank with assets zt solves the following problem: first, based on a borrower’s
delinquency rate, θ, the bank decides whether to lend to him. If the bank chooses to
lend to him, it decides whether to issue a relationship or a transaction loan. Second,
after it sees the cost of staying in the market, the bank decides whether to stay in
the market. Last, if the bank decides to stay, it determines its assets for the next
period.
Vt(zt) = max{zt+1,IR(θ,zt),IT (θ,zt)}
{Mtzαt
∫
θ
[(qR(θ)− c)IR(θ, zt) + qT (θ)IT (θ, zt)]dU(θ)
+Ee[max{βVt+1(zt+1)− gt − et, 0}]}
s.t.
zt+1 = (1− δz)zt + Az1−γt gγt
where IR(θ, zt) is the indicator of relationship lending, I
T (θ, zt) is the indicator of
transaction lending, gt is the amounts of money used for the producing new assets,
et is the cost of staying for the next period, δz is the depreciation rate of assets, β
is the discounting factor and Vt(zt) is the continuation value of the bank with assets
zt in period t. Banks can borrow freely and at a zero interest rate from their future
profits to accumulate assets and to cover the cost of staying.
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Competitive Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium is a deposit interest rate r∗t , a distribution of bank’s assets
Ωt, a set of bank’s decisions {zt+1, IR(θ, zt), IT (θ, zt)}, and the induced valuation
process Vt(zt), such that:
A bank’s decision {zt+1, IR(θ, zt), IT (θ, zt)} solves the problem of the bank with
assets zt at the given deposit interest rate r
∗
t ,
The deposit market is cleared at the market rate r∗t ,∫
zt
∫
θ
Mtz
α
t (I
R(θ, zt) + I
T (θ, zt))dU(θ)dΩt = S
−1(r∗t )
Proposition : For the bank with assets z, there exists two thresholds θ∗ < θ∗∗,
such that if the borrower has a delinquency rate of θ that θ < θ∗ , the bank finances him
with transaction lending; if the borrower has a delinquency rate of θ that θ∗ ≤ θ ≤ θ∗∗,
the bank finances him with relationship lending; and if the borrower has a delinquency
rate of θ that θ > θ∗∗ , the bank will not finance him. Also, if a bank has increasing
marginal costs of building relationships,
∂θ∗
∂z
> 0,
∂θ∗∗
∂z
< 0
Intuitions: The additional expected return from a relationship, θ(RR − RL)− c ,
Therefore, if a borrower’s project is too safe, the additional return from a relationship
exceeds the cost of building the relationship. So, there is a θ∗ such that the cost and
the return are equal. On the other hand, when a project is too risky, its expected
return is less than the cost of financing it, so there is a θ∗∗ such that the bank will
not finance projects with a delinquency rate of θ > θ∗∗. In first case where banks
have increasing marginal costs of building relationships, when a bank has more as-
sets, it can evaluate more borrowers; if the bank chooses to build more relationships,
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Figure 4.1: Shifts of Two Thresholds
This figure shows that there are two thresholds that determine a bank’s transaction lending and
relationship lending. From left to right, borrowers become safer with lower delinquency rates. For
the bank with assets z, there exists two thresholds θ∗ < θ∗∗, such that if the borrower has a
delinquency rate of θ that θ < θ∗ , the bank finances him with transaction lending; if the borrower
has a delinquency rate of θ that θ∗ ≤ θ ≤ θ∗∗, the bank finances him with relationship lending; and
if the borrower has a delinquency rate of θ that θ > θ∗∗ , the bank will not finance him. When
a bank’s has increasing marginal costs of building relationships (ω > 0) and its assets increase, its
risk tolerance for transaction loans increases and its risk tolerance for relationship loans decreases
(that is, θ∗ increases and θ∗∗ decreases); when a bank’s has decreasing marginal costs of building
relationships (ω < 0) and its assets increase, its risk tolerance for transaction loans decreases and
its risk tolerance for relationship loans increases (that is, θ∗ decreases and θ∗∗ increases).
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the bank’s cost of building relationships increases. This increase reduces the surplus
from relationships, and the bank may extend transaction loans to riskier borrowers
who received relationship loans before; in this case, θ∗ shift to the left. In addition,
the bank’s return from the riskiest borrowers, who received relationship loans before,
becomes negative. Therefore the bank will no longer lend to these borrowers; in this
case θ∗∗ shift to the right. The explanation is similar when banks have better lending
technology. In the second case where banks have decreasing marginal costs of build-
ing relationships, the conclusions are on the contrary.
The proposition qualitatively implies that as information technology improves and
banks become more efficient in evaluating borrowers, high-risk borrowers will receive
fewer loans; those that do receive loans are more likely to receive transaction loans.
The model also implies that transaction loans are associated with a riskier pool of
borrowers with IT improvements.
4.3 Estimation
I estimate the model to the U.S. individual commercial bank data to quantify
the IT improvement and its effects on lending to small businesses. I identify a set of
parameters with which the simulated model are quantitatively consistent with the ob-
served behaviors of the U.S. commercial banks. In the data, the bank size distribution
changes over time: banks make more loans and the market concentration increases.
Cross-sectionally, larger banks have a smaller share of small business lending. The
model does a very good job of explaining the change of bank size distribution from
2002 to 2017 and the dollar amount of small business loans and the share of small
business loans for all banks and for large banks (with loans more than $1 billion) in
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2002. The estimation strategy solves the identification challenges mentioned in the
introduction 4 . I do not estimate the model by targeting at the moments about the
change of small business lending from 2002 to 2017; Instead, I simulate the estimated
model to evaluate to what extent, technological improvement can change the supply
of small business lending. By doing so, I separate the effect from supply side.
4.3.1 Data
The data are from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Statistics
on Depository Institutions (SDI). The data are all reported in June of each year. I
use data from 2002 to 2017 and exclude data from 2008 to 2011, the years of the
so-called Subprime Crisis. First, since I do not introduce economic fluctuations in
the model, I cannot explain the data during a crisis using this model. Second, the
market for small business lending is far from securitized in comparison with mort-
gage lending. The collapse of the loan securitization market may not have affected
lending to small businesses. Third, the decline in lending to small businesses may
not come from the demand side. Although during a crisis many small firms exit, the
demand for loans by small businesses is never satisfied. According to statistics from
a financial service company, Behalf, in 2012, 43% of small businesses said that they
were unable to find sources for the business financing they needed (NSBA 2012), and
only 13% of applicants were approved for a small business loan in 2013 (Venture Cap-
ital 2015). I exclude banks that made no small business loans. These banks usually
are small and specialized in a type of lending, such as mortgages or agricultural loans.
4 First, in the data, we cannot see the demand for small business loans. Without a good instru-
ment variable for the supply of small business lending, it is hard to establish casual effect between
IT improvements and decline of lending to small businesses. Second, a bank’s costs of IT is a choice
variable for the bank as well lending to small businesses.
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A bank’s total loans in the model are measured by total loans and leases net of
unearned income 5 . I assume that the loan size distribution does not change much.
Some argue that the development of the securitization market allowed non-jumbo
mortgage loans to become more liquid and that, as a result, banks issue more non-
jumbo mortgage loans and fewer jumbo mortgages. The average loan size would thus
become smaller. However, this change would have little effect on the loan size distri-
bution, as jumbo mortgages account for less than 2% of all mortgages. Relationship
loans are measured as loans to small businesses. Small business loans are loans with
an original amount of $1 million or less that are reported as C&I loans to U.S. ad-
dresses. Banks build relationships when they lend to small firms because small firms
are usually informationally opaque (Berger and Udell, 1995, 2002). Transaction loans
are defined as a bank’s total loans minus its relationship loans. They are car loans,
consumption loans, mortgages, and large C&I loans. Because of the development of
the securitization market, these loans can be easily securitized and sold. Loans in
delinquency are loans that are past due by more than 30 days, interest is unaccrued,
and the loans are charged off. Table 4.1 shows the definition of each variable. Table
4.2 shows the summary of statistics.
The cost of data processing is from Compustat, Bank Fundamental Annual. This
data set had 3,200 banks (in each year) from 2012 to 2017. The average total loans
of these banks is $28,025 million. However, in the FDIC data set, the average loan
amount for a bank is $7,880 million. These banks are larger than the average U.S.
5Unearned revenue is money received by an individual or company for a service or product that
has yet to be fulfilled. Unearned revenue can be thought of as a prepayment for goods or services
that a person or company is expected to produce for the purchaser. As a result of this prepayment,
the seller has a liability equal to the revenue earned until delivery of the good or service. Source:
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/u/unearnedrevenue.asp
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bank. In the model, banks do not differ from productivity of processing information
in a given year even though larger banks have slightly larger marginal costs of eval-
uating hard information. Therefore, the information costs per dollar loans are very
similar across all banks in a given period. The data processing costs represent total
costs and fees incurred in processing banks’ data, including the costs of computer
services, technology, and software. The data show that, from 2012 to 2017, the data
processing costs per dollar of loans decreased by 16%. The costs for a dollar of loans
equal to the information expenses divided by bank total loans in dollar amount. This
is not a perfect measure of bank’s costs of processing information for a dollar of loans.
Perfectly, we should use the information costs divided by the dollar amount of newly
originated loans. However, I cannot see how many loans are originated in a given
year. In the data, bank total loans increase at a quite constant rate and thus, the
flow of loans is probably a constant proportion of the stock of loans. In the estima-
tion, I only need to care about by what percentage, the information costs for a dollar
of loans has decreased. Therefore, the measure I use is a good proxy for banks’ costs
of information for a dollar of loans.
4.3.2 Estimation Method and Results
I estimate the model using the simulated method of moments. I select the values
of parameters to match the key moments in the data with the simulated ones from
the model. For each group of parameters, I compute the optimal choices of each bank
and the deposit interest rate in the equilibrium in each period. The initial period in
the model is the year of 2002. The solution to the banks’ problems is provided in
Appendix. I then compute the moments from the model and compare them with the
moments from the data. The search will stop until distance between the moments in
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the model and the moments in the data is small enough. The weight put on each mo-
ment is normalized to 1. The moments include the dollar amounts of total loans, the
standard variations of total loans, the loan shares of banks with loans totaling more
than $1 billion, the average of banks’ total loans for banks in the top 25% percent
, the average of banks’ total loans for banks in the bottom 25% percent , the dollar
amount and the share of small business loans in 2002, the share of small business
loans by the top 25% of banks in 2002, the loan delinquency rates in 2002 and 2017,
and the average amount and standard variations of total loans of entry banks from
2002 to 2007 and from 2012 to 2017. I put three restrictions in the estimation. First,
the average bank’s productive assets increase over time because the value of bank
software increases over time. Second, the ratio of the standard deviations of bank
loans to the sum of loans increases over time. Third, the ratio of the average dollar
amount of loans by banks in the top 25% to the average dollar amount of loans by
banks in the bottom 25% increases over time. These specifications are consistent with
the data observations.
The estimation is to identify the parameters in a bank’s technology for evaluat-
ing borrowers’ delinquency rates, M0, λ, α,the parameters in a bank’s technology for
building relationships, F, ω, the parameters in the deposit supply function, nr, the
parameters in the technology used by banks to accumulate assets, δz, A, γ, the distri-
bution of the staying costs, µ, σ, the parameters that characterize the returns from
the projects, RH , RL, RR, and the parameters that characterize the asset distribution
of newly entered banks, µz, σz. I estimate period 0 in the model to the year of 2002.
I additionally assume that in the first period, incumbent banks have assets z that
are from the distribution of log− gamma(µ0, σ0). The parameter RH is calculated as
the ratio of incomes from loans to total loans, 1.0375. Assets depreciating rate δz is
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set to 0.004. The discounting factor β is set to 0.996. The number of newly entered
banks (B) are calculated as total de nova banks from 2003 to 2007 and from 2012 to
2017 to the number of years, 89.
I explain the identification of each parameter in this paragraph. The first period of
the model is estimated to the year of 2002. The initial distribution of banks’ pro-
ductive assets is identified from the mean and the standard deviation of bank total
loans in 2002. The parameter α is identified from the growth rate of the standard
deviation of total loans during 2002 to 2017: a larger α increases the growth rate.
The parameter α measures the economy of scale in a bank. Overtime, the distribu-
tion of banks’ productive assets becomes more dispersed. When banks have greater
economy of scale to do lending, the standard deviations increases more from 2002
to 2017. The parameter M0 is identified from the difference of total loans between
large banks (with loans more than $1 billion) and small banks (with loans fewer than
$1 million): a larger M0 increases the difference. The parameter M0 measures the
initial level of lending technology. As better lending technology favors larger banks,
thus a larger M0, a larger difference. The parameter F is identified from the total
amount of small business loans: a larger F increases the amount of small business
loans. The parameter F measures the average costs of building relationships, a larger
F , a smaller costs and thus, more relationship loans. The parameter ω is identified
from the share of small business loans for all banks and for large banks: a larger ω
increases the difference between these two shares. The parameter ω measures the
elasticity between the marginal costs of building relationships and the number of re-
lationships. With a larger ω, large banks have greater decreasing return to scale in
building relationship loans, and then, compared to small banks, they have smaller
shares of small business loans. The parameter λ is identified from the increase of
total loans from 2002 to 2017: a larger λ increases the loan growth rates; this pa-
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rameter measures the advancement rate of technology. The parameter γ is identified
from the change of loan share of large banks: a larger γ increases the growth rate of
the market concentration; this parameter measures banks’ economy of scale in accu-
mulating productive assets. The parameter A is identified from the difference in the
change of total loans for banks at the top and bottom 25%: a smaller A increases
the difference. The parameter nr is identified by the delinquency rates: a larger nr
decreases the delinquency rates; a larger supply elasticity of deposits, a larger deposit
rate with the same amount of deposits, and therefore, a lower delinquency rate. The
parameter µz, σz are identified from the mean and standard deviation of total loans
of newly entered banks. Other parameters are identified jointly. The standard errors
are calculated using the method in Bazdresch et al. (2018). Table 4.3 shows the value
for each parameter and the corresponding moments used to identify them.
The model does a reasonable job of fitting the data . In the model, for the years
2002–2017, total loans increase from $5.16 to $8.6 trillion (vs $5.11 to $8.54 trillion in
the data). For the same period, the standard variations of bank loans increase from
$8.69 to 16.2 billion (vs $8.78 to $24.6 billion in the data). The loan delinquency rates
decrease from 2.33% to 2.3% (vs 2.37% to 2.14% in the data) from 2002 to 2017. The
average bank loans of banks in the top 25% increase from $2.36 to $4.92 billion (vs
$2.43 to $6.58 billion in the data) from 2002 to 2017. The average bank loans of banks
in the bottom 25% increase from $14.7 to $38.6 million (vs $20.7 to 31.5 million in
the data) from 2002 to 2017. The loan share of large banks with loans totaling more
than $1 billion increases from 76% to 85% (vs 81% to 90% in the data) from 2002
to 2017. The share of relationship lending (small business lending) decreases from to
6.7% to 3.7% (vs from 6.6% to 3.5% in the data); for large banks (with loan more
than 1 billion dollars), it decreased from 5.4% to 2% (vs 5.1% to 3% in the data)
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from 2002 to 2017. The dollar amount of relationship lending decreases from $345
billion to $322 billion (vs from $340 billion to $301 billion in the data) from 2002 to
2017. The probability of being a small bank with asset below $100 million decreased
by 17% (vs 18% in the data) from 2002 to 2017. The mean of loans of newly entered
banks is $671 million in the model (vs $675 million in the data); the standard variation
of loans of newly entered banks is $5.7 billion in the model (vs $5.1 billion in the data).
The most important untargeted moment is the cost of data processing per dol-
lar of loans issued. In the model, it shrinks by 15.8% (the cost of processing hard
information in the model is equal to the aggregate bank productive assets divided by
bank total loans) from 2012 to 2017. In the data, it shrinks by 16%.
4.3.3 Comparative Analysis
The comparative analysis provides intuition for my identification of each parame-
ter. I group the parameters in three categories. Group one includes parameters whose
increase will increase total loans but reduce relationship loans, including, M0, α, µ0, σ0.
Group two includes parameters whose increase will increase total loans and relation-
ship loans, including, F,−ω,RR,−nr. Group three includes parameters whose in-
crease will increase the growth rate of total loans, including, λ,A,−γ. The common
features among parameters in the same group create a problem for identifying them.
To identify the parameters in the first group, I need to use the ratio of loan standard
variation to total loans, defined as r1t and the ratio of average loans of large banks
(banks in the top 25%) to average loans of small banks (banks in the bottom 25%),
defined as r2t, where t = 1, ..., 12. I increase M0 from 1339 to 1636, increase α from
.89 to .9, decreases from 1.09 to .88, increase µ0 from 21 to 21.2, and increase σ0 from
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.4 to .42 (Table 4.4). Only an increase of µ0 can increase
r2,12
r2,1
and only an increase
of σ0 can increase
r1,12
r1,1
.
To identify the parameters in the second group, I need to use the moments of
loan delinquency rates, the number of small banks with loans totaling less than $100
million, and the loan share of banks with loans totaling more than $1 billion. I
increase F from 148 to 181, decrease ω from .0279 to .0259, increase RR from .55
to .56, and decrease nr from .152 to .15 (Table 4.5). Only an increase of −nr can
increase the loan delinquency rate in 2017; only an increase of F can decrease the
loan share of large banks with loans more than 1 billion dollars in 2017; an increase
of RR decreases the number of banks with loans fewer than 100 million dollars in 2017.
To identify the parameters in the third group, I need to use r1t and r2t again. I
increase λ from .0365 to .043, decrease γ from .31 to .29, and increase A from .36 to
.38 (Table 4.6). Only a decrease of γ can increase r1,12
r1,1
and only an increase of A can
increase r2,12
r2,1
.
4.4 Counter-factual and Policy Experiments
In this section, I conduct one decomposing analysis and three policy experiments.
I decompose the effects of the substitution mechanisms and the crowding-out mech-
anisms. I find that the first mechanism contributes to 63% of the decline in small
business loans in the model. Consistent with the results from the decomposing analy-
sis, the policy experiment shows that to encourage lending to small businesses, policy
should subsidize lending to small businesses rather than subsidize small banks.
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4.4.1 Decomposing the Effects from Two Mechanisms
In this experiment, I decompose the relative importance from substitution effect
and crowding out effect. The model shows that the cost of processing hard informa-
tion in a loan application for $1 million decreased from $720 in 2002 to $389 in 2017.
As in the model, a bank on average approves 5% of loan applications it evaluates.
Therefore, per dollar transaction loan, a bank saves $0.66 cents (that is, 720−389
1000000
÷5%).
This number is large if we compare it to the average loan spread, about $3 cents. It
also means that the cost of bank transaction lending is reduced by 46%. However, for
each dollar of a relationship loan, the bank needs to pay at least an additional $0.0066
(that is, 1
F (1+ω)
) to build the relationship, so the cost of relationship lending is reduced
by at most 31%. Since technological improvements benefit transaction lending more
than they do relationship lending, banks replace relationship loans with transaction
loans. In the model, because large banks are less constrained in their ability to issue
more loans, large banks benefit more from technological improvements than small
banks and crowd out small banks. The quantitative model infers that a bank with an
additional $1,000 of productive assets can produce at most $1,726 in higher returns
(that is, (0.05α(M12 −M1) + 0.05α(M12 −M1)Aγ(1 − γ))(RH − r)) as a result of
improved IT.
To decompose, I keep the substitution effect and shut down the crowding-out ef-
fects between large and small banks. I keep the distribution of bank productive assets
the same in each year. Under this condition, small business loans decrease by $15
billion dollars, rather than the $24 billion in the benchmark model. I thus conclude
that the substitution effect accounts for at least 63% of the decline.
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4.4.2 Policy Experiments
Using the quantitative model, I experiment with three policies to encourage lend-
ing to small borrowers and compare their effects on small business loans in 2017.
Table 4.7 compares the effects from different policies.
In the first policy experiment, I subsidize banks with 1% of their loan amounts,
when lending to borrowers with delinquency rates greater than or equal to 5%. This
policy reduces the substitution effects. According to the U.S. Small Business Ad-
ministration, from 2002 to 2009 more than 90% of small business loans (in dollar
amount) had a delinquency rate greater than 5%, and in the model all relationship
loans have a delinquency rate greater than 4.9%. The benchmark model shows that
loans to all borrowers with delinquency rates greater than or equal to 5% decreases
from $159 billion to $90 billion; while other borrowers receive more loans from 2002
to 2017. Thus the model indicates that many risky small businesses receive fewer
loans than before, and this reduction in lending to risky small businesses leads to a
decline in small business lending. Therefore I only subsidize lending to risky borrow-
ers. In comparison with the benchmark model, a borrower with a delinquency rate
greater than or equal to 5% receives 4 times more loans in 2017 (from $90 to $428
billion), and other borrowers also receive more loans under this policy. This subsidy
costs $4.28 billion dollars in 2017. A dollar of subsidy to small business lending in-
creases small business lending by $79. Thus, in the context of the model, when the
U.S. Small Business Administration provides subsidized loans and loan guarantees to
small businesses for start-up and expansion, risky small businesses become much less
financially constrained.
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In the second policy experiment, I subsidize small banks (with total loans of less
than $100 million) with 1% of their loan amounts in order to reduce their exit rate.
This policy targets at the crowding-out effect. In comparison with the benchmark
model, this policy does not increase relationship loans. This is because this policy
gives small banks an incentive to grow. When these small banks grow, they reduce
their share of relationship loans to small businesses. This policy costs $796 million in
2017 without an increase in small business lending. A dollar of subsidy to small banks
increases small business lending by $0. Berger et al. (2005) suggests that instead of
subsidizing small business lending directly, we should subsidize the intermediaries
that have a comparative advantage in relationship lending. My study shows that if
we do not consider the general effects and the substitution effects, this policy will
increase lending to small business loans by $10 for $1 subsidy of $100 to small banks’
loans. However, when we consider these two effects, this policy does not have any
effect on lending to small business loans.
In the last policy experiment, I decrease small banks’ costs of staying by 1% (small
banks: banks with loans of less than $100 million). This experiment is to see whether
lending to small businesses will increase if policy decreases small banks’ regulatory
burden. I find that lending to small businesses in 2017 increases from $322 to $343
billion under this policy. This policy costs $10,475 billion. Therefore, $1 of decrease
in banks’ regulatory burden increases small business lending by $0.002.
4.5 Conclusions, Implications and Future Work
I study the effects of IT improvements on small business lending in a quantita-
tive structural framework. The framework includes a dynamic model of relationship
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banking, an estimation that quantifies the advancement of IT improvements in the
banking market, and an evaluation of policies that may encourage lending to small
businesses. The model does a reasonable job of explaining some key features of the
U.S. commercial banking market: the increasing market concentration, the exit of
small banks, and the difference in the share of small business loans among large and
small banks. The model shows that when the data processing costs per loan dollar
decline by 2.5% annually, lending to small businesses declines 1% annually. This de-
cline may lead to an annual loss of 50,000 jobs according to Chen et al. (2017). The
findings in this paper add insight to the debate over how to encourage lending to small
businesses. They imply that policy should subsidize small risky borrowers, not small
banks, even though small banks may have a comparative advantage in relationship
lending. This research also implies that even if the repeal of Dodd-Frank Act can de-
crease the regulatory burden on banks, lending to small businesses may increase little.
Conducting a welfare analysis of the reallocation of bank loans from small to large
firms can be very interesting and meaningful; however, it will complicate the model
too much and is away from the focus of this paper. I will address this question in my
next paper, in which we study how the reallocation of bank lending can increase the
monopsony power in local labor market and therefore, decrease workers’ wage income.
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Table 4.1: Definitions of Variables
The table shows how I measure the model variables in the data. I use net total loans and leases
in the data to measure the variable of total loans in the model. I use commercial and industrial
loans less than $1 million dollars in the data (i.e. small business loans) to measure the variable of
relationship loans in the model. I use sum of loans past due, unaccrual and charged-off to net total
loans and leases in the data to measure the variable of delinquency rate in the model.
Definitions in the Data Variables in the Model
net total loans and leases total loans
commercial and industrial loans less than 1
million dollars
relationship loans
sum of loans past due, unaccrual and charged
off/net total loans and leases
delinquency rate
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Table 4.2: Summary of Statistics
The table shows the summary of statistics. In the paper, I only use the data of banks that have
small business loans. Most US commercial banks have lending to small businesses. Very specialized
banks may not issue loans to small businesses. I also exclude data from 2008 to 2011, which is the
Great Recession. All the numbers are in millions of constant 2017 U.S. dollar. I use total loans and
leases in the data to measure total loans. I use commercial and industrial loans less than $1 million
dollars in the data to measure small business loans. I use sum of loans past due, unaccrual and
charged-off as delinquent loans.
2002-2007, 2012-2017, No.of banks= 78,190
Variables Mean Std Min Max
total loans 1,052 16,800 9 940,000
small businesses loans 47 447 0 29,800
delinquent loans 31 759 0 82,300
total interest and fee income on
loans
37 593 0 38,400
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Table 4.3: Values of Parameters and Targeted Moments
This table shows the values for each estimated parameter and the moments that used to identify the
values of each parameter. The sample period is 2002-2017, excluding 2008-2011, with 78,190 banks.
Estimation is done with the simulated method of moments. The standard errors are calculated using
the method from Bazdresch et al. (2018) (in parentheses). I choose structural model parameters by
matching the moments from the dynamic general equilibrium model to the corresponding moments
from these data. The model is solved by value-function iteration. The estimation is to identify
the parameters in a bank’s technology for evaluating borrowers’ delinquency rates, M0, λ, α,the
parameters in a bank’s technology for building relationships, F, ω, the parameters in the deposit
supply function, nr, the parameters in the technology used by banks to accumulate assets, δz, A, γ,
the distribution of the staying costs, µ, σ, the parameters that characterize the returns from the
projects, RL, RR, and the parameters that characterize the asset distribution of newly entered
banks, µz, σz. I estimate period 0 in the model to the year of 2002. In the first period, incumbent
banks have assets z that are from the distribution of log − gamma(µ0, σ0).
Parameter Description Value Moments
M0 1,339 total loans of large and small banks
parameters in the technology (0.80)
α of evaluating borrowers’ credit .89 market concentration
(0.0003)
F 148
parameters in the technology (0.1) small business loans:
ω of building relationships .0279 shares and amounts in each year
(0.00005)
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RL liquidation value .34 share of small business loans
(0.0001)
RR return from restructured debt .553 delinquency rates
(0.0002)
λ measure of technological .0365 annual loan growth rates
improvement (0.00007)
γ .31 market concentration
parameter in assets (0.0013)
A accumulation technology .36
(0.0002)
µ mean of the log of 5 probability of being a small bank
the staying costs (0.013)
σ std of of the log of 7.8
the staying costs (0.0008)
µz mean of the log of 27.5 mean of loans of new born banks
assets of new born banks (0.037)
σz std of the log of .3 std of of loans of new born banks
assets of new born banks (0.0002)
µ0 4*log of assets of incumbent banks 21 total loans: mean
(0.021)
σ0 .4 total loans: std
(0.0008)
nr parameter in deposit .152 delinquency rates
supply function (0.00007)
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Table 4.4: Moments Comparison I
The table shows the results when I change the values of some parameters. In the baseline model,
M0 = 1, 339, α = .89, µ0 = 21, σ0 = .4. In the table, the ratio of loan standard variation to total
loans, is defined as r1,t and the ratio of average loans of large banks (banks in the top 25%) to the
average loans of small banks (banks in the bottom 25%), is defined as r2,t, where t = 1, ..., 12.
Parameter
r1,12
r1,1
r2,12
r2,1
M0 = 1, 636 .94 .96
α = .9 .5 .88
µ0 = 21.2 1.11 1.17
σ0 = .42 1.1 1.08
baseline 1.14 1.09
Table 4.5: Moments Comparison II
The table shows the results when I change the values of some parameters. In the baseline model,
F = 148, ω = .0279, RR = .553, nr = .152. In the table, the delinquency rate, the number of small
banks, and the loan share of large banks are the average of these moments for each year. Small
banks are banks with loans totaling less than $100 million dollars, and large banks are banks with
loans totaling more than $1 billion.
Parameter Delinquency Rate No. of Small Banks Loan Share of Large Banks
F = 181 .0208 3,541 80.7%
ω = .0259 .0227 3,224 81.3%
RR = .56 .0226 2,771 84.3%
nr = .15 .0233 2,514 80.9%
baseline .023 2,790 80.8%
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Table 4.6: Moments Comparison III
The table shows the results when I change the values of some parameters. In the baseline model,
λ = .0365, γ = .31, A = .36. In the table, the ratio of loan standard variation to total loans, is
defined as r1,t and the ratio of average loans of large banks (banks in the top 25%) to the average
loans of small banks (banks in the bottom 25%), is defined as r2,t, where t = 1, ..., 12.
Parameter
r1,12
r1,1
r2,12
r2,1
λ = .043 .72 1.03
γ = .29 1.18 1.12
A = .38 1.13 1.16
baseline 1.14 1.09
Table 4.7: Policy Comparisons
In the table, I compare the effects from different policies, including the increase in dollar amount of
small business loans, the delinquency rates and the policy effects without general equilibrium effects
or substitution effects. In the first policy, I subsidize small banks with loans less than $100 million.
In the second policy, I reduce the staying costs of small banks with loans less than $100 million. In
the last policy, I subsidize loans to borrowers with delinquency rates equal to or greater than 5%.
In the data, these loans are small business loans.
$1 Subsidy of $100 to Increase in Small Delinquency No Substitution
Business Lending Rate or GE Effect
small banks $0 2.29% $10
small banks’ staying costs 0.2 cents 2.28% 0.02 cents
loans with delinquency rates ≥ 5% $79 2.34%
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A.1 MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3
Proofs One
In the part, we prove that the small bank has no incentive to restructure.
When the small bank finds it profitable to restructure, j = S
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That is, the large bank will restructure.
When the large bank restructures, the price of internet banking will be set to
pI,t ≤ cImSB , where the small bank finds it unprofitable to add internet banking;
therefore, the small bank will not restructure.
Proofs Two
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exp(−′)exp(−exp(−′))d′
Note
exp(−)exp(−exp(−))d = d
(
exp(−exp(−))
)
So QI,t
=
∫ ∞
−∞
(
1− exp(−exp(−((γ′0 − γ0) + (γ
′
1 − γ1)
pI,t
pB,t
+ (γ
′
2 − γ2)x+ 
′
)))
)
exp(−′)exp(−exp(−′))d′
Because ∫ ∞
−∞
aexp(−)exp(−aexp(−))d = 1
QI,t
= 1−
∫ ∞
−∞
exp(−exp((γ0 − γ′0) + (γ1 − γ
′
1)
pI,t
pB,t
+ (γ2 − γ′2)x− 
′
))
exp(−′)exp(−exp(−′))d′
= 1−
∫ ∞
−∞
exp(−′)exp
(
−exp(−′)(1+exp((γ0−γ′0)+(γ1−γ
′
1)
pI,t
pB,t
+(γ2−γ′2)x))
)
d
′
Because ∫ ∞
−∞
aexp(−)exp(−aexp(−))d = 1
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= 1− 1
1 + exp
{
(γ0 − γ′0) + (γ1 − γ′1) pI,tpB,t + (γ2 − γ
′
2)x
}
Because ∫ ∞
−∞
exp(−)exp(−aexp(−))d = 1/a
and here,
a = 1 + exp((γ0 − γ′0) + (γ1 − γ
′
1)
pI,t
pB,t
+ (γ2 − γ′2)x)
So QI,t
=
exp
{
(γ0 − γ′0) + (γ1 − γ′1) pI,tpB,t + (γ2 − γ
′
2)x
}
1 + exp
{
(γ0 − γ′0) + (γ1 − γ′1) pI,tpB,t + (γ2 − γ
′
2)x
}
Note: ∫ ∞
−∞
aexp(−)exp(−aexp(−))d
=
∫ ∞
−∞
d
(
exp(−aexp(−))
)
= 1
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A.2 MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 4
A.2.1 Proof of Theorem 1
The bank with assets z solves:
max
Ij ,ISj
{m(z)(
∫ θ∗∗
θ∗
((1− θ)RH + θRR − r)dθ +
∫ θ∗
0
((1− θ)RH + θRL − r)dθ)− Lsc(Ls)}
where Ls = m(z)(θ∗∗ − θ∗), c(LS) = 1F (ω+1) (LS)ω
Take the first order conditions of θ∗∗, θ∗ :
F ((1− θ∗∗)RH + θ∗∗(RR − r) = [m(z)(θ∗∗ − θ∗)]ω (A.1)
Fθ∗RR = [m(z)(θ∗∗ − θ∗)]ω (A.2)
Solve θ∗∗ from equation (6),
θ∗∗ = θ∗ +
1
m(z)
[Fθ∗RR]1/ω (A.3)
From (5) and (6):
θ∗RR = (1− θ∗∗)RH + θ∗∗RR − r (A.4)
Take (7) into (8),
θ∗(RH −RL) = RH − 1
m(z)
[F (1− θ∗)RR]1/ω(RH −RL −RR)− r (A.5)
from (9) we see that when z increases, θ∗ is larger. Similarly, I solve θ∗∗ and I find that when z
increases, θ∗∗ is smaller.
A.2.2 Model Computation
Banks’ choice of relationship and transaction loans in each period is a static problem. In the
first step, I compute banks’ choice of relationship loans and transaction loans at the assumed deposit
interest rate. In the second step, I compute the deposit interest rate that clears the deposit market.
In the third step, I update the deposit interest rate and in the last step, I iterate steps 1-3 until the
deposit interest rates converge.
The computation of dynamic programming takes four steps. In the first step, I compute banks’
value function at the initial assumed deposit interest rate, {rt}t=1,2,...,. I apply the contraction
mapping theorem. I start by making an initial guess about the value function at each assets point
(an initial guess of zero at each point). I compute the first iteration of the value function by
considering the future value as the initial guess. This will yield a new value (the sum of the current
payoff and the discounted (expected) future payoff). I use this value as the future value in the next
iteration to produce a new value, etc. 1 In the second step, I solve banks’ problems and compute
the deposit interest rate that clears the deposit market in each period. In the third step, I update
the deposit interest rates, {rt}t=1,2,..., and in the last step, I iterate step 1-3 until the deposit interest
rates converge.
1 The computation of value function is referred to http://home.uchicago.edu/hickmanbr/uploads/chapter5 2.pdf
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